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ABSTRACT 
 
Patrick C. Miller, THE COLLABORATIVE PROJECT:  PRINCIPALS’ PERCEPTIONS 
RELATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A TEACHER 
PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE INITIATIVE (Under the direction of Dr. William Grobe). 
Department of Educational Leadership, February 2011. 
 
 The Collaborative Project (CP) began as a pilot project in five low-wealth, rural 
school districts in North Carolina in August, 2007.  The Project included a performance 
incentive initiative for teachers and administrators along with a professional 
development component and a set of after-school programs for underachieving 
students.  The pilot phase continued for three years.  The objective of this study was to 
document and examine principals’ perceptions of the performance incentive initiative to 
determine the challenges and successes encountered during the development and 
implementation of the program  
 The researcher utilized a qualitative interview process to collect data. The 
participants in the study were principals from the participating districts who had served 
in their positions for two or more years of the performance incentive program.  Every 
eligible principal consented to be interviewed for this study with the exception of the 
principals in the researcher’s district, who were excluded from the study because of the 
researcher’s role as superintendent of the district. 
 The principals’ responses were analyzed and tables were constructed to show 
the main types of responses for each question, the number of principals who voiced 
each type of response, and short quotes illustrating each type of response.  For 
triangulation purposes, the results were compared with survey data from a June, 2009 
evaluation completed by the Carolina Institute for Public Policy. 
 Overall, the majority of the principals interviewed believed the student 
achievement, professional development, and principal’s evaluation components of the 
teacher performance incentive criteria helped their schools.  The results of the study 
provided insight into some of the anomalies encountered by the CP leadership during 
the development and implementation of this performance incentive program.  For 
example, some principals noted instances of teachers of non-tested grades/subjects 
receiving more performance incentive for student achievement than some teachers of 
tested grades/subjects.  The interview process revealed some unanticipated results not 
mentioned in the review of the literature, such as a quid pro quo between some 
principals and teachers.  Therefore, this study may provide a significant contribution to 
the literature on the development and implementation of performance incentive 
programs. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Teacher compensation has been and remains an issue of debate in most areas 
of the United States (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  Most stakeholders have an opinion on 
teacher pay – some think teachers are not paid enough, some think teachers are 
adequately compensated, and some think teachers are overpaid (Odden & Kelley, 
2002).  Regardless, there have been many efforts across the country in the past to pay 
teachers more (Martin, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002).   
 Some researchers argue the reasons for the increased efforts to raise teacher 
pay have grown out of the desire to recruit and retain teachers (Odden & Kelley, 2002; 
Wallis, 2008).  Others believe the drive to increase teacher pay has resulted from the 
increased emphasis on accountability for student performance (Kauffmann, 2007; 
Martin, 2007; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  Others debate the need for performance 
pay because the results of standardized tests across the nation have shown the United 
States is lagging behind many other countries educationally (Gratz, 2010).  
Traditionally, teachers in the United States have been compensated using a 
single salary schedule based solely on the number of years of experience and/or the 
attainment of advanced degrees (Odden & Kelley, 2002; Palumbo, 2007).  Many of the 
past efforts to reform teacher pay and move away from the traditional salary schedule 
have incorporated some type of performance-based incentives to reward teachers for 
student achievement and/or the successful completion of professional development 
modules (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  Other efforts to reform teacher pay incorporated 
subjective teacher evaluations completed by school administrators as a method of 
determining whether or not a teacher earned a bonus (Baber, 2007; Palumbo, 2007). 
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Until recently, nearly all attempts to change the way teachers are compensated have 
failed to produce any lasting results (LeFevre, 2001; Perkins-Gough, 2007).  Therefore, 
the traditional teacher salary schedule continues to serve as the basic structure for 
teacher compensation nationwide (Koppich, 2010; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  
William J. Slotnik, a technical advisor to a number of districts implementing performance 
pay programs, recently said, “We’re really at a very critical juncture because we’re now 
25 years beyond the failed merit-pay experiments of the early 1980s.  And if we 
replicate the same mistakes that burdened that movement, we’re going to lose a 
generation of compensation reform” (Olson, 2007, p. 2). 
 In their book “Paying Teachers for What They Know and Do,” authors Allan 
Odden and Carolyn Kelley (2002) argue it is possible to create successful teacher 
performance pay initiatives based on lessons learned from earlier failed attempts at 
teacher performance pay.  In a recent article, William J. Slotnik also postulated that 
performance-based compensation can serve as a catalyst for educational change, but 
only if educators manage to avoid repeating mistakes made in the past (Slotnik, 2010).  
There is some agreement in the body of literature on specific components of a 
performance pay system in education that increase the likelihood of a success (Center 
for Teaching Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Perkins-Gough, 2007).  
Among the generally agreed upon components of a performance pay system are:  
providing additional pay for individuals who participate in additional and relevant 
professional development, encouraging collaboration, and including stakeholders in the 
planning and implementation of new performance pay programs (Center for Teaching 
Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Perkins-Gough, 2007). 
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Even with the studies reported in this dissertation, the number of research-based 
evaluative studies on performance pay initiatives is small; therefore, more studies are 
needed to illuminate issues surrounding performance pay initiatives (Hulleman & 
Barron, 2010; Olson, 2007; Ritter & Jensen, 2010). 
Need for the Study 
 
The need for research studies on the development, implementation, and 
effectiveness of teacher performance pay initiatives is increasing.  There is growing 
national interest in performance pay initiatives in the K-12 education system (Podgursky 
& Springer, 2007).  Groups like the federally-funded National Center of Performance 
Initiatives (NCPI) at Vanderbilt University’s Peabody College, the Education 
Commission of the States (ECS), Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., and the Center for 
Educator Compensation Reform have begun tracking teacher and administrator 
compensation reforms, issues, and research opportunities (Podgursky & Springer, 
2007).  Consequently, the United States Department of Education has placed 
performance incentives/pay for teachers at the top of its reform efforts by allotting the 
largest portion of the 500-point Race to the Top rubric for performance pay (Springer & 
Gardner, 2010; U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  Because the interest in 
performance pay programs is growing, along with the number of performance pay 
programs under development and in various phases of implementation throughout the 
country, the need for research studies to illuminate potential issues surrounding these 
performance pay initiatives is increasing.   
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Statement of the Problem 
 
This study will document and examine principals’ perceptions and opinions of the 
Collaborative Project (CP), a teacher performance incentive initiative, to determine the 
successes, challenges, and dilemmas associated with the design and implementation of 
the initiative that may not have been fully revealed during a more quantitative analysis 
of the CP performed by the Carolina Institute for Public Policy (CIPP).  Research on 
performance pay initiatives is limited; therefore, the Collaborative Project presents an 
opportunity for research on performance incentives at a time when interest in these 
initiatives is high (Hulleman & Barron, 2010; Olson, 2007; Ritter & Jensen, 2010).  
Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine, through an interview process with 
principals involved in the Collaborative Project, successes, challenges, and dilemmas 
faced within five North Carolina school districts during the development and 
implementation of a performance incentive program. The information that these 
principals may provide regarding the performance incentives associated with the 
Collaborative Project may provide clarification for school leaders wishing to design and 
implement a similar program in the future.  The information may also help school 
leaders decide whether or not they want to pursue a performance incentive program at 
all. 
Significance of the Study 
 
This study may be a significant addition to the limited number of studies in 
existence on the design and implementation of performance incentive programs for 
individual teachers. 
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The breadth of existing studies on the evaluation of performance pay initiatives in 
K-12 education are very diverse in terms of the design of the incentive plans, the type of 
incentive (knowledge- and skills-based or merit-based), and the duration of the incentive 
program (Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  However, one 
shortcoming in the literature is the lack of a research-based prescription describing how 
performance pay initiatives should be designed (Podgursky & Springer, 2007; Ritter & 
Jensen, 2010).  For example, do the size of the incentives and/or the mixture of 
knowledge- and skills-based incentives with merit-based incentives make any difference 
in the design?  Further experimentation at the district and state level is needed to 
generate more conclusive evaluation results.   
Research Questions 
 This study was guided by the following questions: 
1. What are the major challenges and dilemmas for school leaders in designing 
a performance incentive system for individual teachers? 
2. How did the leadership of the Collaborative Project address the challenges 
and dilemmas that arose during the implementation of the performance 
incentive system? 
3. How did principals, teachers, and others involved in the implementation 
respond to the design of the Collaborative Project? 
a. To what degree were the responses positive? 
b. To what degree were the responses negative? 
c. What unforeseen challenges or dilemmas emerged during 
implementation? 
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4. What are the implications for school leaders of the Collaborative Project’s 
experience in designing and implementing a performance incentive system 
for individual teachers for future efforts to create performance incentive 
systems designed to improve student achievement? 
Overview of Methodology 
 The researcher utilized a qualitative approach for this study.  Specifically, an 
interview process was employed to determine the perceptions and opinions of principals 
within the five districts of the Collaborative Project (CP) as they relate to the design and 
implementation of the performance incentive component.   
The interview process utilized what Patton (2002) calls the “Standardized Open-
Ended Interview”.  There are four main reasons for using this type of interview format 
(Patton, 2002).  They are:   
1. The exact instrument used in the interview is available for inspection by those 
who may use the findings. 
2. Variation among interviewers can be minimized. 
3. The interview is more focused so interviewee time is used more efficiently. 
4. Analysis is facilitated by making responses easier to find and compare 
(Patton, 2002). 
 Through an interview process with principals from participating districts in the CP, 
this researcher documented and examined the perceptions and opinions of principals to 
determine whether there were successes, challenges, and/or dilemmas associated with 
the design and implementation of the CP that may not have been fully revealed during a 
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more quantitative analysis of the project performed by the Carolina Institute for Public 
Policy (CIPP). 
As mentioned previously, the standardized open-ended interview format was 
utilized for the principal interviews.  The interview instrument developed by the 
researcher is presented in Appendix A.  The CP principals who consented to be 
interviewed were asked a series of eight questions.  The questions included in the 
interview were comprised of two different types:  opinion and values questions and 
knowledge questions (Patton, 2002).  
 The interviews were recorded and used as a basis for the creation of field notes 
by the researcher. All of the principals’ responses to each question were reviewed, 
question by question.  For each question, the main types of responses were identified.  
A table was constructed showing the main types of responses for each question, the 
number of principals who spoke to or voiced each type of response, and two or three 
short quotes illustrating each type of response.  During the analysis for each question, 
the findings were compared with the survey data from the June, 2009 program 
evaluation completed by CIPP for triangulation purposes.  Finally, a summary of the 
findings was written. 
Definition of Terms 
 
 Prior to examining the relationship between performance pay initiatives for 
teachers and students achievement, several terms require definition. 
1. North Carolina End-of-Grade Tests of Reading Comprehension and Math: 
EOG Tests are North Carolina’s state-developed standardized tests in 
reading and math designed to assess the competencies defined by the North 
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Carolina Standard Course of Study in grades 3-8 (North Carolina Department 
of Public Instruction website:  Retrieved from 
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/accountability/testing/eog/). 
2. Achievement levels:  Proficiency levels, also known as achievement levels, 
refer to student achievement on North Carolina's end-of-grade tests and end-
of-course tests, which is reported by four achievement levels: Level I, 
insufficient mastery; Level II, inconsistent mastery; Level III, mastery; and 
Level IV, superior.  Level III is considered to be at grade level and Level IV is 
considered above grade level (NCDPI website:  Retrieved from 
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/accountability/testing/shared/achievelevel/). 
3. Knowledge- and Skills-based pay: The provision of additional pay for 
participating in additional and relevant professional development is a 
component of knowledge- and skills-based pay (Goldhaber, 2006; Odden & 
Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  According to Odden, knowledge- 
and skills-based pay provides extrinsic rewards to educators for the continued 
development of professional expertise (Kellor, Milanowski, Odden & 
Gallagher, 2001; Odden & Kellor, 2000).  Another researcher, Milanowski, 
asserted that knowledge- and skills-based pay programs have the potential to 
positively affect student achievement indirectly by changing teacher 
instruction for the better (Kellor et al., 2001).  According to Milanowski, there 
are three ways knowledge- and skills-based pay makes this possible:  by 
providing stipends or other incentives for educators to develop specific 
knowledge and skills, granting higher pay to educators who possess the 
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necessary knowledge and skills to stay in the profession, and creating a 
“model of competence” that can be used for professional development and 
the evaluation of personnel (Kellor et al., 2001).  The first knowledge- and 
skills-based pay component was certification by the National Board for 
Professional Teaching Standards (Goldhaber, 2006; Odden & Kelley, 2002).  
Other components of a knowledge- and skills-based compensation program 
(KSBP) include the acquisition and development of new skills and knowledge 
related to content, curriculum, and instruction (Goldhaber, 2006; Odden & 
Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
4. Merit-based performance awards for individual teachers:  Merit-based 
performance awards reward individual teachers for any number of factors, 
including student performance and classroom evaluation results (Odden & 
Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
5. Merit-based performance awards for groups of teachers or entire schools:  
Merit-based performance awards of this type reward groups of teachers or 
entire faculties/schools for any number of factors, including student 
performance and classroom evaluation results (Odden & Kelley, 2002; 
Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
6. The Collaborative Project:  The Collaborative Project (CP) is a three-year pilot 
project that began in August, 2007 in five North Carolina counties:  Caswell, 
Greene, Mitchell, Warren, and Washington (About the collaborative, n.d.).  
Funded by the North Carolina General Assembly as an experiment in the 
recruitment and retention of teachers, the $7 million project is administered 
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jointly by the Public School Forum of North Carolina and the North Carolina 
Science, Mathematics, and Technology Education Center (About the 
collaborative, n.d.).  The CP features three main components:  professional 
development, performance incentives, and after-school programs.  Teachers 
participating in the project may earn up to $2,000 in performance incentives 
per year based on the following components:  teacher evaluation, 
professional development, student achievement, and parental contacts 
(About the collaborative, n.d.).  A more detailed description of the CP may be 
found in Chapter three. 
Limitations of the Study 
 
 The Collaborative Project (CP) districts and schools are not chosen randomly 
from the larger population of schools in North Carolina.  Thus, the researcher was not 
able to generalize findings in any rigorous way to other schools and districts.  However,  
placing findings from the study in the context of existing research on the topic should 
enable the researcher to suggest what some of the wider implications may be.   
 The researcher is a participant in the CP; therefore, this study represents a type 
of participant observation.  Also, the researcher’s role as superintendent of a 
participating district presents unique problems for the study.  
 In an effort to overcome problems associated with reliance upon one method of 
data collection, the researcher will use the findings from the June, 2009 CIPP teacher 
survey to complement and cross-check results of the interviews with the principals.   
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Research Organization 
 This research study is organized into five chapters. Chapter one is an 
introduction to the study; Chapter two consists of a thorough review of literature relating 
to performance pay for teachers and relevant subtopics; in Chapter three, a description 
of the methodology used for this study is detailed; Chapter four is a review of the results 
in relation to the research questions and hypotheses of the study; finally, Chapter five 
includes a thorough discussion of the results of the study, conclusions reached, 
implications of the study, and recommendations for further research.   
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER TWO:  REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
This study investigated principals’ perceptions of teacher performance pay 
initiatives as well as their perceptions of the relationship that performance pay for 
teachers has on student achievement as measured by North Carolina End-of-Grade 
Tests of Reading Comprehension and Math.  This literature review addresses the 
following related topics: 
• A brief history of performance pay initiatives. 
• Reasons for an increase in performance pay initiatives. 
• Types of performance pay. 
• Performance pay evaluative studies:  past and present. 
• Teacher unions and performance pay initiatives 
• Effective educational leadership. 
• Relationship of educational leadership to a performance pay initiative (The 
Collaborative Project). 
Brief History of Performance Pay Initiatives 
Traditionally, teachers in the United States have been compensated using a 
single salary schedule based solely on the number of years of experience and/or the 
attainment of advanced degrees, regardless of race, gender, and/or grade level taught 
(Odden & Kelley, 2002; Palumbo, 2007).  The single salary schedule was first 
introduced to teachers in 1921 in Denver, Colorado and Des Moines, Iowa (Sharpes, 
1987).  In America, the single salary schedule had been adopted by 97% of schools by 
1950 (Sharpes, 1987).  The advantages of the single salary schedule, including 
predictability and ease of administration, have made this method of compensation 
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durable and difficult to change (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  Also, the single salary 
schedule was championed by teacher unions as the only structure that provided 
equality for all teachers (Kerchner, Koppich, & Weeres, 1997). 
Despite its perceived advantages, the single salary schedule has its share of 
critics (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  Many feel the single salary schedule is unfair for paying 
teachers equally with the same education and experience while neglecting effort, 
professional competencies, and/or student achievement (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  In 
1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education released A Nation at Risk.  
After this report was published, Ronald Reagan’s administration pressed for merit pay 
for educators (Sessions, 1996).  One of the many recommendations outlined in this 
report addressed teacher salaries.  Teacher salaries should be “professionally 
competitive, market-sensitive, and performance-based” (National Commission on 
Excellence in Education, 1983).  In response to A Nation at Risk, school districts across 
the nation implemented a rash of incentive pay programs, including merit pay and 
career ladders (Cooper, 1991; Ianelli, 2002; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Sessions, 1996; 
Zhang, 2002).  Most of these efforts to reform teacher compensation were short-lived 
and unsuccessful (Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
Teacher compensation is an issue of debate in most areas of the United States 
(Odden & Kelley, 2002).  Most stakeholders have an opinion on teacher pay – some 
think teachers are not paid enough, some think teachers are adequately compensated, 
and some think teachers are overpaid (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  Research from the 
business sector provides a mixed picture of the effectiveness of performance pay in 
increasing productivity of workers (Hulleman & Barron, 2010).  Regardless, there have 
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been many efforts across the country in the past to pay teachers more (Martin, 2007; 
Odden & Kelley, 2002).  
The work of two prominent behavioral theorists addresses the issue of 
performance pay in education.  Abraham Maslow and Frederick Herzberg both 
formulated behavioral theories that have withstood the test of time in the business world 
(Gawel, 1997).  Herzberg, the psychologist, proposed a theory about factors in the 
workplace that motivate employees (Gawel, 1997; Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 
1959).  Herzberg’s contemporary, Maslow, a behavioral scientist, formulated a hierarchy 
of needs and how people pursue these needs (Gawel, 1997; Maslow, 1970).   
Abraham Maslow’s research in the 1940s and early 1950s about how people 
satisfy various personal needs within the context of their work culminated in Maslow’s 
1954 book, Motivation and Personality (Gawel, 1997; Maslow, 1970).  Maslow 
developed a theory, based on his observations, that people follow a pattern or hierarchy 
of needs recognition and satisfaction (Gawel, 1997; Maslow, 1970).  In general people 
tend to follow this hierarchy of needs in the same sequence (Gawel, 1997; Maslow, 
1970).  Maslow also postulated as part of this theory that people could not pursue the 
next higher need in the hierarchy until the need currently recognized had been 
substantially satisfied (Gawel, 1997; Maslow, 1970).  Maslow called this concept 
prepotency (Gawel, 1997; Maslow, 1970).   
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is often illustrated as a pyramid with the most basic 
needs for survival at the bottom and the need for self-actualization at the top (Gawel, 
1997; Maslow, 1970).  According to Maslow (1970), the needs, from bottom to top, are 
listed in Table 1.  In the business world, safety needs could include protection against  
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Table 1 
 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
 
Level Type of Need Example(s) 
   
1 Physiological Food, water, sleep 
   
2 Safety Security of:  body, employment, resources 
   
3 Love and Belonging Friendship, family 
   
4 Esteem Self-esteem, confidence, achievement, respect of others 
   
5 Self-actualization Morality, creativity, acceptance of facts 
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unemployment and protection from the loss of income due to sickness (Maslow, 1970; 
Maslow, 2010).  The need to belong may include the need for someone to identify with 
a particular group or department at work (Maslow, 1970; Maslow hierarchy of needs, 
2010).  Esteem needs may include the need for recognition for a job well done (Maslow, 
1970; Maslow hierarchy of needs, 2010).   Self-actualization may be affected by the 
amount of challenge or success at work (Maslow, 1970; Maslow hierarchy of needs, 
2010).  For example, according to a study conducted by Bellott and Tutor (1990), 
teachers were less satisfied with their personal achievement of esteem than with their 
achievement of self-actualization (Gawel, 1997).  Therefore, based on the results of the 
study by Bellott and Tutor, self-actualization is a prepotent need for esteem (Bellott & 
Tutor, 1990; Gawel, 1997).  While Maslow’s hierarchy of needs may still have broad 
applicability in the business world, at least one aspect of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
does not seem to hold up in the case of teachers (Bellott & Tutor, 1990; Gawel, 1997). 
 Research led by Frederick Herzberg in the business sector in the 1950s 
suggested that performance incentives did not motivate employees to work harder 
(Herzberg et al., 1959).  Herzberg created a two-dimensional model of factors that affect 
peoples’ attitudes about their work (Herzberg et al., 1959).  Factors such as salary were 
classified within this model as hygiene factors rather than motivators (Herzberg et al., 
1959).  Herzberg et al. (1959) wrote that hygiene factors operate “to remove health 
hazards from the environment of man”.  According to Herzberg et al.’s (1959) theory, 
the absence of hygiene factors can create job dissatisfaction but their presence does 
not necessarily equate to job satisfaction (p. 113).   
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Research conducted by Bellott and Tutor (1990) suggested two problems with 
Herzberg’s work:  that the research occurred too long ago to be pertinent and that it did 
not pertain to teachers (Bellott & Tutor, 1990; Gawel, 1997).  Bellott and Tutor referred 
to research completed by Tutor in 1986 on the Tennessee Career Ladder Program 
(TCLP) as a way of refuting Herzberg’s research (Gawel, 1997).  In Herzberg’s model, 
achievement ranks as the most important of five motivation factors; however, Tutor’s 
research on the TCLP found that salary was the single most important influence on the 
decision of teachers to participate in the TCLP (Gawel, 1997; Herzberg et al., 1959; 
Tutor, 1986).  Therefore, Bellott and Tutor concluded that while Herzberg’s model may 
still have applicability in the business world, the model does not seem to apply to 
teachers (Bellott & Tutor, 1990; Gawel, 1997). 
Reasons for an Increase in Performance Pay Initiatives 
Some researchers argue the reasons for the increased efforts to raise teacher 
pay have grown out of the desire to recruit and retain more teachers (Cooper, 1991; 
Kelley, 2000; McCaffrey, Han, & Lockwood, 2008; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Sessions, 
1996; Wallis, 2008; Zhang, 2002).  Others believe the drive to increase teacher pay has 
resulted from the increased emphasis on accountability/improving student achievement 
(Ianelli, 2002; Kauffmann, 2007; Kellor et al., 2001; Lewis & Springer, 2008; Martin, 
2007; Odden & Kellor, 2000; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
Many of the past efforts to reform teacher pay and move away from the 
traditional salary schedule have incorporated some type of performance-based 
incentives to reward teachers for student achievement and/or the successful completion 
of professional development modules (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  Other initiatives 
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incorporated subjective teacher evaluations completed by school administrators as a 
method of determining whether or not a teacher earned additional pay (Baber, 2007; 
Palumbo, 2007).  Until recently, nearly all attempts to change the way teachers are 
compensated have failed to produce any lasting results (Perkins-Gough, 2007; LeFevre, 
2001).  Therefore, the traditional teacher salary schedule continues to serve as the 
basic structure for teacher compensation nationwide (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
In the past twenty-five years, there have been many short-lived and less than 
successful attempts to reform traditional teacher salary schedules based on years of 
experience and/or degrees attained with more performance-based pay systems (Olson, 
2007).  Currently, at least half a dozen states, including North Carolina, have statewide 
or pilot programs that provide teachers with performance incentives based on student 
achievement at the school or classroom level (Olson, 2007).  On a smaller level, 
hundreds of districts are experimenting with performance incentive programs, although 
few have eliminated pay increases based on years of experience or degrees attained 
(Olson, 2007).  According to Williams J. Slotnik, a technical advisor to a number of 
districts implementing performance pay programs, “we’re really at a very critical juncture 
because we’re now 25 years beyond the failed merit-pay experiments of the early 
1980s.  And if we replicate the same mistakes that burdened that movement, we’re 
going to lose a generation of compensation reform” (Olson, 2007, p. 2). 
In their book “Paying Teachers for What They Know and Do,” authors Allan 
Odden and Carolyn Kelley (2002) argue it is possible to create successful teacher 
performance pay initiatives based on lessons learned from earlier failed attempts at 
teacher performance pay.  There is some agreement in the body of literature on specific 
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components of a performance pay system in education that increase the likelihood of a 
successful performance pay program (Center for Teaching Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; 
Odden & Kelley, 2002; Perkins-Gough, 2007).  Among the generally agreed upon 
components of a performance pay system are:  providing additional pay for individuals 
who participate in additional and relevant professional development, encouraging 
collaboration, and including teachers in the planning and implementation of new 
performance pay programs (Center for Teaching Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; Odden & 
Kelley, 2002; Perkins-Gough, 2007). 
Types of Performance Pay 
The three most common types of performance pay structures in performance pay 
programs currently in existence are: 
1. knowledge- and skills-based pay for individual teachers,  
2. merit-based performance awards for individual teachers, and  
3. merit-based performance awards for groups of teachers or entire schools 
(Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).   
The provision of supplemental pay for participating in additional and relevant 
professional development is a component of knowledge- and skills-based pay 
(Goldhaber, 2006; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  The first 
knowledge- and skills-based pay component was certification by the National Board for 
Professional Teaching Standards (Goldhaber, 2006; Odden & Kelley, 2002).  Other 
components of a knowledge- and skills-based compensation program (KSBP) include 
the acquisition and development of new skills and knowledge related to content, 
curriculum, and instruction (Goldhaber, 2006; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & 
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Springer, 2007).  Merit-based performance awards reward individual teachers, groups 
of teachers, or entire schools on any number of factors, including student performance, 
completion of a project such as a portfolio, and classroom evaluation results (Odden & 
Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
Performance Pay Evaluative Studies:  Past and Present 
Research linking performance pay for teachers to gains in student achievement 
is limited (Olson, 2007).  However, some recent studies have identified a positive 
relationship between performance incentives for teachers and increased student 
achievement (Olson, 2007).  Other studies have identified mixed results (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007).  There have also been studies that found negative relationships 
between performance incentives and student achievement (Eberts, Hollenbeck, & 
Stone, 2002; Greene & Winters, 2007; LeFevre, 2001; Olsen, 2001).  This section of the 
review of literature will outline some of the studies that attempted to link performance 
pay to increases in student achievement. 
Studies Yielding Positive Results 
According to a recently released paper entitled “Do Individual Teacher Incentives 
Boost Student Performance?” by David Figlio and Lawrence Kenny, professors at the 
University of Florida, performance pay for teachers had more positive effects on student 
achievement than class size reduction initiatives or stricter attendance requirements 
(Goldhaber, 2006; Keen, 2007).  According to Figlio, “This research provides the first 
systematic evidence of a relationship between individual teacher performance 
incentives and student achievement in the United States.  We demonstrate that 
students learn more when teachers are given financial incentives to do more” as cited in 
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Keen (2007, p. 1).  Figlio and Kenny collected data via surveys from 534 schools among 
the 1,319 participants in a national study sponsored by the United States Department of 
Education (Keen, 2007).  Figlio and Kenny concluded that students at schools with 
performance pay initiatives scored an average of 1.3 to 2.1 points higher on 
standardized tests with a standard deviation of 33 than students at schools without 
performance pay initiatives (Goldhaber, 2006; Keen, 2007).  The study suggested that 
performance pay initiatives, even when controlled for other factors, appeared to be 
effective at improving student achievement (Goldhaber, 2006; Keen, 2007).  The study 
by Figlio and Kenny also found that the effects of performance pay initiatives were 
stronger in the poorest schools (Keen, 2007). 
In a study by Helen Ladd of a performance pay initiative in Dallas, Texas from 
1991-1995, student test scores in Dallas were compared with gains in other cities, with 
adjustments made for socioeconomic status and race (Lavy, 2007; Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007).  Ladd found that proficiency rates increased more quickly in Dallas 
than in other cities; therefore, Ladd concluded the performance pay program was 
effective in increasing student achievement on math and reading test scores (Lavy, 
2007; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
Likewise, Cooper and Cohn (1997) discovered that teachers who received a 
performance bonus as part of a performance play plan in South Carolina had higher 
classroom average student achievement. 
One of the most widely implemented performance pay initiatives is the national 
Teacher Advancement Program (TAP).  Begun in 1999 by the Milken Family 
Foundation, TAP provides monetary rewards to teachers who increase student 
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achievement and who receive favorable evaluations by multiple certified TAP evaluators 
four to six times per academic year (Holland, 2005; Olson, 2007).  An evaluation of TAP 
was released in 2007, and it found that teachers in schools that participate in the 
program are more likely to significantly raise student achievement than similar teachers 
in public schools (Olson, 2007).  According to the TAP website, 
www.talentedteachers.org, TAP has been implemented in 220 schools for the 2008-09 
school year, affecting 6,200 teachers and 72,000 students.   
In a 2005 study by Robert Holland, a performance pay initiative found in the 
Chattanooga, Tennessee public schools appeared to be producing significant 
improvements in student achievement in the traditionally low-performing, inner-city 
schools of the district (Holland, 2005).  In Chattanooga’s initiative, teachers who agreed 
to work in the traditionally low-performing, inner-city schools of the district and then 
realized gains in student achievement received $5,000 annual bonuses along with other 
perks (Holland, 2005). 
Several researchers noted a successful performance pay initiative found in 
Meadowcliff Elementary School and four other elementary schools in Little Rock, 
Arkansas (Holland, 2005; Viadero, 2007; National Center on Performance Incentives, 
2008b).  At Meadowcliff, teachers received bonuses based on the increase in each 
individual student’s test scores (Holland, 2005; Viadero, 2007).  Teachers received 
$100 per student whose scores rise at least 4%, $200 for each student who gains 5% to 
9%, $300 per students who gains in the range of 10% to 14%, and $400 per student for 
gains exceeding 14% (Holland, 2005).  The potential total bonus could be $11,200 a 
year for a teacher – a substantial incentive (Viadero, 2007).  In one year, Meadowcliff 
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Elementary School realized a gain of 17% on the Stanford Achievement Test (Holland, 
2005).  Viadero concluded that performance incentives for teachers significantly 
improved academic performance of students (Viadero, 2007).  Studies on this and 
several other Arkansas elementary schools by Winters, Ritter, Barnett, and Greene in 
2006 also found a positive correlation between the performance incentives and 
standardized math test scores of students in grades four and five  (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007; Winters, Ritter, Barnett, & Greene, 2006).  In a 2008 study, researchers 
from the National Center on Performance Incentives discovered that students whose 
teachers were eligible for performance pay realized significantly larger test score gains 
in math and reading than did students taught by teachers ineligible for performance pay 
(2008b).  These researchers also found that the greatest gains were associated with 
teachers who had historically proven less effective at producing growth in students 
(National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008b). 
In his 2007 article, Lavy cited two studies of a South Carolina performance pay 
initiative.  Both studies concluded that student achievement improved as a result of the 
performance pay program but offered a caveat:  teachers could choose to apply for the 
bonuses (Lavy, 2007).  It is highly likely that only the most effective teachers chose to 
apply which may have indicated teacher quality played a larger role than performance 
incentives in the South Carolina study (Lavy, 2007). 
Podgursky and Springer (2007), discuss ten quantitative studies of the effect of 
performance pay programs on student achievement.  Of the ten studies examined, eight 
demonstrated that performance pay resulted in positive gains in student achievement;  
 24 
 
the remaining two studies revealed mixed results on student achievement (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007).   
Several of the studies examined by Podgursky and Springer were conducted in 
other countries.  Podgursky and Springer included the results of these studies in their 
article due to the scarcity of quantitative evaluations of performance pay programs on 
student achievement here in the United States (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).   
One of these studies took place in 500 rural Indian primary schools during 2004-
2005 (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  The results, published in 2006 by Muralidaran and 
Sundararaman, showed positive increases in math and reading tests in schools with 
group and individual performance incentives in place (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).   
Lavy, in two separate studies conducted in Israel from 1993-1997 and again from 
1999-2001, found a positive correlation between performance incentives and test 
scores in low socioeconomic Israeli high schools (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  Lavy 
also concluded that performance incentives contributed to higher pass rates and lower 
dropout rates in the Israeli high schools during the time of his study (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007). 
A group of researchers from the National Center on Performance Incentives 
(2008a) concluded that Missouri’s Career Ladder Program had a limited but positive 
effect on student achievement.  Their research uncovered a positive correlation 
between the performance pay program and student achievement, but the results were 
small for math and not statistically significant for reading in the three grade levels 
studied (National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008a). 
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Studies Yielding Mixed Results 
In a 2004 study by Glewwe and his colleagues, 100 primary schools in rural 
Kenya were studied with 50 schools randomly chosen to receive performance 
incentives (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  Teachers could receive up to 43% of their 
monthly salary in performance pay based on test scores of students in grades 4 and 8 
(Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  The results of this study were mixed (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007).  Glewwe and his colleagues found that test scores increased during 
the two years of the program but in the third year, once the program ended, the 
increases dropped off which led the authors to believe the increases were the result of 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the teachers (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
The other study examined by Podgursky and Springer that yielded mixed results 
took place in two alternative high schools in Michigan (1 treatment and 1 control).  
Teachers could receive up to 20% of their base pay in performance incentives based on 
student course completion rates, pass rates, daily attendance, and grade-point average 
(Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  This performance pay program was implemented as a 
strategy to combat a high dropout problem (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  The 
incentive program raised the rate of course completions but the student pass rates and 
grade point averages dropped (Podgursky and Springer, 2007).  Podgursky and 
Springer postulated that a better performance pay plan incorporating a larger number of 
performance indicators might have yielded more positive results in Michigan (Podgursky 
& Springer, 2007).   
In an evaluation of the Collaborative Project (CP) in North Carolina released in 
June, 2010, researchers from the Carolina Institute for Public Policy (CIPP) noted that 
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 the data collected from the participating districts indicated several areas of success.   
Among these successes were identifying and rewarding effective teachers and linking 
higher gains in student achievement to student achievement to certain types 
professional development offered through The Collaborative Project (Carolina Institute 
for Public Policy [CIPP], 2010).  Despite the successes associated with The 
Collaborative Project, the researchers concluded that the performance incentives 
associated with the project had not created a statistically significant effect on student 
achievement in any of the five participating districts (CIPP, 2010).  To remind the 
reader, the CP is the performance incentive initiative upon which this study is based. 
Additionally, researchers from the National Center on Performance Incentives in 
Nashville, TN released their findings from an evaluation of the Project on Incentives in 
Teaching (POINT) on September 21, 2010 (National Center on Performance Incentives, 
2010).  According to the report, POINT was a study of middle school math teachers 
conducted over a three-year period (2006-09) in the Metro-Nashville Public Schools 
(National Center on Performance Incentives, 2010).  Middle school math teachers 
volunteered to participate in a controlled experiment to evaluate the effect of offering 
substantial performance incentives to teachers whose students achieved larger than 
expected gains on standardized tests (National Center on Performance Incentives, 
2010).  The researchers concluded that the performance incentives had no effect on 
student achievement in math overall across all grade levels studied and over the years 
of the study (National Center on Performance Incentives, 2010).  However, the 
researchers did note a positive effect for incentives in the fifth grade during the second 
and third years of the experiment (National Center on Performance Incentives, 2010).  
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The researchers added that though robust, the finding was of limited policy significance 
because the effect did not carry over when the students left the fifth grade (National 
Center on Performance Incentives, 2010).   
Studies Yielding Negative Results 
Not all researchers believe there is a positive correlation between performance 
incentives and student achievement.  According to Darcy Olsen (2001), director of 
education and child policy at the Cato Institute, teacher salaries show very little effect on 
student performance.  Olsen stated the average teacher salary in Washington, DC tops 
those in forty-four other states, yet student achievement is among the worst in the 
nation (Olsen, 2001). 
In 1985, a federal judge took control of the Kansas City, Missouri school district 
because, in his opinion, the district was unconstitutionally segregated (LeFevre, 2001).  
Numerous spending initiatives were implemented under judge’s orders, including a forty 
percent raise in teacher pay as an incentive to increase student achievement (LeFevre, 
2001).  The district also received more money per pupil than any school district in the 
nation (LeFevre, 2001).  After a twelve year period, a study conducted by the Cato 
Institute showed that student achievement did not increase as a result of increased 
teacher salaries (LeFevre, 2001). 
A 2002 study conducted by Eberts, Hollenbeck, and Stone found that a 
performance pay plan implemented in a district in Pennsylvania increased teacher 
retention rates, had no effect on students’ grade point averages, and the percentage of 
students who failed increased during the same period (Eberts et al., 2002). 
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In conclusion, the number of research studies on performance pay programs for 
teachers is small; therefore, more studies in this area are needed.  However, most of 
the studies that have been conducted in recent history suggest positive results and 
make a strong case for further policy experimentation in the area of teacher 
compensation (Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  According to 
Podgursky and Springer (2007), even the studies showing mixed results suggest that 
teacher incentive programs change teacher behavior positively.  The lesson for 
education policy-makers is this:  design performance-pay programs for teachers 
carefully and expect to make improvements to the programs as more is learned about 
the teacher responses to the incentives (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
Based on the body of available literature, it is safe to conclude that a 
performance incentive program can be created that is fair to all, effective, and supported 
by teachers.  Including stakeholders, primarily teachers, in the planning and 
implementation of performance pay initiatives appears to be crucial; in most failed 
attempts, stakeholders were not included in the planning and implementation of the 
programs (Center for Teaching Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; 
Perkins-Gough, 2007). 
This section of the review of literature encompassed evaluations of performance 
pay initiatives that found a positive correlation between performance pay programs and 
student achievement, evaluations of performance pay programs that revealed mixed 
results on student achievement, and evaluations of performance pay initiatives that 
found negative correlations between performance pay initiatives and student 
achievement. 
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Teacher Unions and Performance Pay Initiatives 
Teacher unions historically have been very much opposed to any performance 
pay plan that moves teacher compensation away from the traditional salary schedule 
because the plans tend to expose the weaker teachers very quickly (Cooper, 1991; 
Goldhaber, 2006; Holland, 2005; Ianelli, 2002; Zhang, 2002).  The unions favor the 
traditional salary scales because of the protection the older system affords mediocre 
teachers (Holland, 2005).  Districts that have teacher unions and performance pay 
initiatives have had to work very hard and very closely with the union administration to 
put performance pay initiatives in place (Kelley, 2000; Odden & Kellor, 2000; Spiller, 
2002).  The unions fear that allowing for merit-based performance pay for individuals 
would weaken the collective bargaining power of the union (Holland, 2005).  Many 
stakeholders who champion teacher pay reforms often point to the collective bargaining 
agreements negotiated with school districts by teachers’ unions as a major obstacle to 
reform (Goldhaber, 2006). 
There is a sharp contrast between the views of performance pay plans in the 
platforms of the two largest unions, the NEA and the AFT (Goldhaber, 2006)(see Table 
2).  In its 2006 NEA Handbook, the NEA reiterates that it strongly supports the use of 
the traditional salary schedule based on degrees attained, professional growth, and 
professional service (Goldhaber, 2006; Koppich, 2010).  Further, the handbook 
specifically opposes performance pay or any additional compensation intended to 
attract or retain teachers for hard-to-recruit positions (Goldhaber, 2006; Koppich, 2010).  
The AFT, on the other hand, recognizes problems within the traditional salary schedule. 
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Table 2 
NEA and AFT on Performance Pay (Koppich, 2010, p. 24) 
 
Extra compensation for… NEA AFT 
   
Increased teacher knowledge and 
skill 
Yes Yes 
   
Teaching in hard-to-staff schools Yes Yes 
   
Teaching hard-to-staff subjects No Yes 
   
Assuming added professional 
responsibilities, such as mentoring 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
   
Linking teacher pay to student test 
scores 
No No for individual teachers; 
Yes for group pay based on 
school-wide improvement as 
measured by student test 
scores 
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They suggest that the traditional salary schedule has severe drawbacks and “does not 
allow teachers to be compensated like other professionals in our society” (Goldhaber, 
2006, p. 21).  While not specifically endorsing performance pay initiatives, the AFT 
urges affiliates to explore alternative teacher evaluation and compensation systems 
(Goldhaber, 2006).  Despite union opposition in the past to performance pay initiatives, 
many states and school districts are making headway in providing knowledge- and 
skills-based pay and/or merit-based pay for teachers, ending decades of basing teacher 
compensation strictly on seniority and the attainment of educational degrees 
(Goldhaber, 2006; Holland, 2005; Tomsho, 2006). 
Unpublished studies researched noted strong opposition on the part of teachers’ 
unions as one of the primary deterrents for the creation and implementation of merit pay 
programs (Ianelli, 2002; Zhang, 2002).  In his 2002 dissertation, Zhang suggested this 
opposition on the part of unions exists because teacher evaluation instruments can be 
subjective and arbitrary.  Both the AFT and the National Education Association (NEA) 
have argued, according to Zhang (2002), that teacher effectiveness cannot be fairly 
rated due to the intangible nature of educational goals and ideals. 
North Carolina has had a merit-based performance award system for entire 
schools, based on student growth, in place since the 1996-1997 school year (The ABCs 
of Public Education, n.d.).  North Carolina also rewards teachers who achieve 
certification by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards by paying them 
an additional twelve percent (12%) for ten years (National Board Certification, n.d.).  
Rewarding teachers for the acquisition of new skills and knowledge presumably related 
to better instruction, such as National Board certification, is an example of knowledge- 
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and skills-based performance pay (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).  Definitions of 
knowledge- and skills-based performance pay and merit-based performance pay are 
provided in the introduction of this study.  In 2007, North Carolina began yet another 
performance pay initiative – The Collaborative Project (About the collaborative, n.d.). 
Effective Educational Leadership 
In their 2005 book, School Leadership That Works, Robert J. Marzano, Timothy 
Waters, and Brian A. McNulty argue convincingly that leadership is vital to the 
effectiveness of a school.  The American Heritage College Dictionary (2004, p. 787) 
defines the term leadership as “the capacity or ability to lead.”  That same dictionary 
defines lead a number of ways, including “to guide the behavior or opinion of” and “to 
direct the performance or activities of” (American Heritage College Dictionary, 2004, p. 
787).  Evidence of discussions of leadership date back thousands of years and appear 
in the writings of ancient philosophers and statesmen such as Plato, Caesar, and 
Plutarch (Marzano, Waters, & McNulty, 2005). 
Again, the supposition that leadership is crucial to the success of any 
organization dates back centuries (Marzano et al., 2005).  Long-standing traditions and 
beliefs regarding leadership in other institutions, such as business, are no different than 
those in schools; therefore, if one considers those traditions and beliefs from other 
institutions, a case may be made that leadership is critical if a school is to be considered 
effective (Marzano et al., 2005).   
In their 2005 book, Marzano et al. cite a breadth of research linking school 
leadership to: 
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• School climate and the climate in teachers’ classrooms (Brookover, Beady, 
Flood, Schweitzer & Wisenbaker, 1979; Brookover et al., 1978; Brookover & 
Lezotte, 1979; Griffith, 2000; Marzano et al., 2005; Villani, 1996). 
• Practices of teachers within their classrooms (Brookover et al., 1978; 
Brookover & Lezotte, 1979; Marzano et al., 2005; McDill, Rigsby, & Meyers, 
1969; Miller & Sayre, 1986) 
• The opportunity for students to learn (Duke & Canady, 1991; Dwyer, 1986; 
Marzano et al., 2005; Murphy & Hallinger, 1989). 
Based on the research above, it can be inferred that an effective leader is 
necessary for a school to be considered effective.  In 1977, a U.S. Senate Committee 
Report on Equal Educational Opportunity (1970) reported: 
In many ways the school principal is the most important and influential individual 
in any school.  He or she is the person responsible for all activities that occur in 
and around the school building.  It is the principal’s leadership that sets the tone 
of the school, the climate for teaching, the level of professionalism and morale of 
teachers, and the degree of concern for what the students may or may not 
become.  (p. 56)  
Research suggests principal leadership has an effect on student achievement 
(Cotton, 2003; Leithwood, Louis, Andersen, & Wahlstrom, 2004; Marzano et al., 2005).  
In a 2003 study, Cotton noted that principal leadership has an indirect effect on student 
achievement.  She stated, “most of [the effect] is indirect, that is, mediated through 
teachers and others” (Cotton, 2003).  One of the major conclusions from the 2004 study 
conducted by Leithwood et al. is that leadership ra
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instruction in determining what students learn in school.  A synthesis of existing 
research conducted by Marzano et al. (2005) also suggests a strong correlation 
between educational leadership and student achievement.    
Educational leadership also plays a major role in how well teachers support 
incentive pay, according to a 2007 study by Jacob and Springer.  The results of that 
study found that certain characteristics of teachers are directly related to support of 
performance incentives (Jacob & Springer, 2007).  According to the researchers, 
teachers who conveyed a positive view of the leadership abilities of their principal 
tended to be more supportive of performance incentives (Jacob & Springer, 2007). 
Relationship of Educational Leadership to a Performance Pay Initiative  
(The Collaborative Project) 
The Collaborative Project (CP) is a three-year pilot project that began in August, 
2007 in five North Carolina counties:  Caswell, Greene, Mitchell, Warren, and 
Washington (About the collaborative, n.d.).  Funded by the North Carolina General 
Assembly as an experiment in the recruitment/retention of teachers, the $7 million 
project is administered jointly by the Public School Forum of North Carolina and the 
North Carolina Science, Mathematics, and Technology Education Center (About the 
collaborative, n.d.). 
The CP features three main components:  professional development, 
performance incentives, and after-school programs.  This researcher will be focusing on 
the performance incentive component for this study. 
Teachers participating in the project may earn up to $2,000 in performance 
incentives per year based on the following components:  teacher evaluation, 
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professional development, student achievement, and parental contacts (About the 
collaborative, n.d.).  The Collaborative Project incorporates a knowledge- and skills-
based awards and merit-based performance awards for individual teachers as 
described in the first chapter. 
The Collaborative Project also provides leadership development for educational 
leaders.  Four times per academic year, superintendents, central office contacts, and 
principals of participating schools gather for three-day leadership institutes (About the 
collaborative, n.d.). 
In August of 2008, the leadership of the CP contracted with the Carolina Institute 
of Public Policy (CIPP) to formally evaluate the project.  To date, CIPP has released 
three reports on the Collaborative Project (CP). 
The first, a preliminary report, was released in February of 2009.  At that time in 
the implementation of the Collaborative Project and with limited data available, the 
researchers were unable to draw any conclusions regarding the impact of the 
performance incentives on teacher quality, teacher and administrator retention, or 
student achievement (CIPP, 2009a).  The evaluators were able to assess the design of 
the Collaborative Project and its subsequent implementation through the study of 
existing data and from interviews with teachers and administrators from the participating 
districts (CIPP, 2009a).  The evaluators reported that the strategies of the CP appeared 
well conceived to address goals and the challenges of the five participating districts as 
identified by the leadership of the districts (CIPP, 2009a).  Further, the CP evaluators 
identified areas of uneven implementation and snags in the implementation of the CP 
(CIPP, 2009a).  One potential dilemma identified by the CIPP evaluators was the 
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treatment of teachers of tested subjects versus teachers of subjects not tested.  The 
researchers noted that the leadership of the CP ultimately decided to reward teachers of 
tested subjects for their own students’ performance and teachers of non-tested subjects 
for the overall performance of the school (CIPP, 2009a). 
 While the evaluators noted that the CP leadership had worked to address 
challenges as they became apparent, they also warned that the report may identify new 
issues that would need to be addressed for the goals of the CP to be fully realized 
(CIPP, 2009a).  Overall, the evaluators found that the CP seemed well-designed and on 
the road to a successful implementation (CIPP, 2009a). 
The second report, issued in June 2009, focused on the first two years of the CP 
(CIPP, 2009b). For the second report, the evaluators from CIPP had more data from 
which to work, including data from the five participating districts, NCDPI, data from three 
rounds of interviews conducted with stakeholders from the participating districts, and the 
results of an online survey of teachers (CIPP, 2009b).  The evaluators found the 
performance incentive component well designed, well implemented, and fully functional 
(CIPP, 2009b).  They noted that the system could be applied in any rural school district 
across North Carolina (CIPP, 2009b).  Further, the evaluators mentioned that the 
leadership of the CP had “demonstrated an ability to continue adapting and refining the 
systems, based on experience, feedback from participating districts, and external 
evaluation” (CIPP, 2009b, p. 35).  However, they noted that, despite modestly 
encouraging test score data from the participating districts, there was still work to be 
done in the third year of the pilot (CIPP, 2009b).  A substantial impact could not be 
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documented in two years; therefore, data from the third year of the CP was needed 
(CIPP, 2009b). 
In June, 2010, the evaluators from CIPP released an assessment of the impact 
of the first two years of the CIPP (CIPP, 2010).  The data analyzed by the CIPP 
suggested that the components of the CP had not exerted a statistically significant 
overall effect on student achievement in the five participating districts (CIPP, 2010).  
The CIPP evaluators did note that there were “significant and sometimes striking links 
between participation in certain types of professional development and student 
achievement and between incentive awards and student achievement” over the first two 
years of the project (CIPP, 2010, p. i).  Specifically, the data suggested that there were 
two ways that the performance incentives might affect the behavior and motivation of 
the teachers in the participating districts (CIPP, 2010).  The first way the incentives 
might motivate teachers was named the anticipatory effect by the CIPP evaluators 
(CIPP, 2010).  Teachers affected by the anticipatory effect may be more motivated to 
improve during a given year in anticipation of a bonus paid in the fall of the following 
year (CIPP, 2010).  The other effect was named the post-award effect by the 
researchers (CIPP, 2010).  Teachers motivated by the post-award effect would have 
received a bonus and then may be motivated to improve even more during the following 
year (CIPP, 2010).  The evaluators from CIPP analyzed the CP performance incentive 
impacts for both types of effect (CIPP, 2010).  In June of 2010 when the third report was 
released by CIPP, two rounds of payment had been made to teachers in the 
participating districts:  the first in the fall of 2008 based on work from the 2007-08 school 
year and in the fall of 2009 based on work from the 2008-09 school year (CIPP, 2010).  
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Therefore, the anticipatory effect could have affected teachers twice (2007-08 and 
2008-09) while the post-award effect could only have affected teachers once after the 
payment in fall of 2008 (CIPP, 2010).  In short, the CIPP evaluators found that in both 
the anticipatory and the post-award analyses, students taught by teachers who earned 
higher performance incentive bonuses achieved larger gains on the EOG in 
mathematics than did students taught by teachers who earned lower performance 
incentive bonuses or no bonus at all (CIPP, 2010).   
Anticipatory Effects 
Student Performance 
Students taught by teachers who earned the maximum performance incentive of 
$500 for student performance made significantly more progress on End of Grade (EOG) 
tests in both reading and math than those taught by teachers who earned no 
performance incentive (CIPP, 2010).  Therefore, the evaluators concluded that the 
performance incentive component of the CP did reward teachers who facilitated the 
most student learning (CIPP, 2010).  The evaluators further noted they could not be 
certain the teachers achieved this result because of the anticipated incentive; these 
teachers may have produced these results without the performance incentives (CIPP, 
2010)(see Table 3). 
Principal Evaluations 
On the EOG in math, students whose teachers earned the maximum 
performance incentive of $500 for the principal evaluation component made more gains 
than those students of teachers who earned a lesser or no performance incentive 
(CIPP, 2010)(see Table 3). 
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Table 3 
 
Anticipatory Effects of Performance Incentive Awards (CIPP, 2010, p. 15) 
 
Criteria Mathematics Reading 
   
Student Performance Highest payments 
associated with higher test 
scores 
Highest payments 
associated with higher test 
scores 
   
Principal Evaluation Highest payments 
associated with higher test 
scores 
No relationship between 
higher payments and test 
scores 
   
Parent/Community  
Contacts 
No relationship with test 
scores 
No relationship with test 
scores 
   
Professional Development No relationship between 
lower payments and test 
scores 
No relationship with test 
scores 
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Parent and Community Contacts 
The CIPP evaluators found no association between the level of award in this 
area and student achievement (CIPP, 2010)(see Table 3). 
Professional Development 
As was the case with parent and community contacts, the CIPP evaluators found 
no association between the level of award in this area and student achievement (CIPP, 
2010)(see Table 3). 
Post-Award Effects 
Student Performance 
Students taught by teachers who earned larger performance incentive bonuses 
in the fall of 2008 made more progress on the 2008-09 EOGs in reading and math than 
did students of teachers who earned smaller performance incentive bonuses (CIPP, 
2010).  The evaluators noted they could not be certain the teachers achieved this result 
because of the performance incentive; these teachers may have produced these results 
without the performance incentives (CIPP, 2010)(see Table 4). 
Principal Evaluations 
 On the EOG in math and reading, students whose teachers earned the maximum 
performance incentive of $500 for the principal evaluation component earned better 
scores than those students of teachers who earned a lesser or no performance 
incentive (CIPP, 2010)(see Table 4). 
Parent and Community Contacts 
The CIPP evaluators found no association between the level of award in this 
area and student achievement (CIPP, 2010)(see Table 4). 
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Table 4 
 
Post-Award Effects:  Motivating Future Performance (CIPP, 2010, p. 16) 
 
Criteria Mathematics Reading 
   
Student Performance Higher payments 
associated with higher test 
scores 
Higher payments 
associated with higher test 
scores 
   
Principal Evaluation Higher payments 
associated with higher test 
scores 
Higher payments 
associated with higher test 
scores 
   
Parent and Community 
Contacts 
No relationship between 
higher payments and test 
scores 
No relationship with test 
scores 
   
Professional Development Higher payments 
associated with higher test 
scores 
No relationship with test 
scores 
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Professional Development 
Students taught by teachers who earned the maximum performance incentive of 
$500 for participation in professional development scored better on the EOG in 
mathematics than students taught by teachers who earned no performance incentive in 
this area (CIPP, 2010). 
Based on the results of the analyses of both effects into account, the evaluators 
suggest there is evidence that the performance incentives for student performance did 
reward the teachers who students made higher gains on their EOG tests (CIPP, 2010).  
The principals’ evaluations also rewarded effective math teachers but the researchers 
noted that the evidence on reading was mixed (CIPP, 2010).  In neither analysis were 
the performance incentives for parent and community contacts associated with higher 
student test scores (CIPP, 2010).  Finally, the CIPP evaluators noted that higher 
performance incentive payments in the area of professional development may have 
contributed to higher test scores in math but not in reading (CIPP, 2010)(see Table 4). 
 
  
CHAPTER THREE:  METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 To remind the reader, the research questions guiding the present study include: 
1. What are the major challenges and dilemmas for school leaders in designing 
a performance incentive system for individual teachers? 
2. How did the leadership of the Collaborative Project address the challenges 
and dilemmas that arose during the implementation of the performance 
incentive system? 
3. How did principals, teachers, and others involved in the implementation 
respond to the design of the Collaborative Project? 
a. To what degree were the responses positive? 
b. To what degree were the responses negative? 
c. What unforeseen challenges or dilemmas emerged during 
implementation? 
4. What are the implications for school leaders of the Collaborative Project’s 
experience in designing and implementing a performance incentive system 
for individual teachers for future efforts to create performance incentive 
systems designed to improve student achievement? 
 This chapter explains how these questions will be addressed, beginning with 
some background on the Collaborative Project. The focus will then turn to the research 
design, including the choice of qualitative approach, main data collection approach, 
participants, interview design, interview protocol, data analysis and interpretation, and a 
discussion of the limitations and special challenges of this particular study.
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Background on the Collaborative Project 
 In early 2007, the leadership of the North Carolina Senate approached the Public 
School Forum of North Carolina (Forum) with a request to create an “out-of-the-box” 
pilot program focused on the recruitment and retention of teachers in small, rural, and 
low-wealth school districts.  From these conversations, the idea of the Collaborative 
Project (CP) germinated.  During the formative early discussions, a decision was made 
to provide high-quality professional development in math and science to the teachers in 
the participating districts as a recruitment and retention strategy; therefore, the 
leadership of the Forum invited the North Carolina, Science, Mathematics, and 
Technology Education Center (SMT) to serve as joint administrator.  The first official 
meeting of the CP took place in Raleigh on August 10, 2007.  Because of the focus on 
high school reform created by Judge Howard Manning, there was already a great deal 
of reform activity at that level across the state.  Therefore, the CP leadership made the 
decision to limit the scope of the CP to grades K-8 (CIPP, 2009a).  In September 2007, 
superintendents and principals from the five participating districts (Caswell, Greene, 
Mitchell, Warren and Washington Counties) met in Raleigh to begin designing the 
Collaborative Project.  During that meeting and another in Asheville in November, the 
leadership from the Forum, the SMT, and the five districts created the framework of the 
performance incentive component of the CP.  To remind the reader, the inclusion of 
stakeholders in the planning and implementation of performance incentive programs is 
a component that increases the likelihood of a successful program (Center for Teaching 
Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Perkins-Gough, 2007).   
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The pilot phase of the Collaborative Project was slated to last three years, 
beginning with the 2007-08 school year and ending with the close of the 2009-10 school 
year.  The General Assembly extended the life of the CP by providing a fourth year; 
therefore, the CP ceased existence as a pilot and became a program for the 2010-11 
school year.  
 According to its website, the CP has three main goals:   
1. A positive impact on student performance 
2. A positive impact on recruitment and retention 
3. Access by participating school systems to quality professional development 
resources 
Although the performance incentive component is the particular focus of the 
present study, it does not represent the entire CP approach to achieving these goals.  
The Project features three main components:  intensive, high-quality professional 
development for teachers, principals, and central office administrators; the 
aforementioned performance incentives for teachers, principals, and central office 
administrators; and enrichment-based after school programs for two schools per 
participating district (CIPP, 2010).  Five school systems defined by the state as small, 
rural, and low wealth are participants in the Collaborative Project:  Caswell County, 
Greene County, Mitchell County, Warren County, and Washington County (CIPP, 
2010). 
 The performance incentive component was created to improve student 
achievement as measured by North Carolina End-of-Grade (EOG) tests in grades 3-8 
and to reduce teacher turnover by providing opportunities for teachers to earn additional 
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compensation for extra effort and high performance (CIPP, 2010).  Teachers in 
participating districts could earn performance incentive bonuses of up to $2,000 for 
meeting criteria in four areas:  days of participation in professional development, the 
percent of students at or above proficiency within their classrooms, the number of 
documented parent contact hours in a school year, and for a certain designation on the 
principal’s evaluation combined with the decision to return to the district to teach 
another year (CIPP, 2010).  Teachers could earn $0, $300, $400, or $500 based on 
criteria in each of the four areas (CIPP, 2010).  The teachers in the five CP districts 
began working to earn the performance incentives in January of 2008.  Principals were 
eligible for deferred compensation of $22,500 plus interest ($7,500 per year for three 
years) based on four areas:  student performance, building a learning community, 
creating a positive workforce environment, and the superintendent’s evaluation (CIPP, 
2010).  Like teachers, assistant principals were eligible for a performance incentive 
bonus of up to $2,000 annually based on criteria very similar to those of principals.  The 
individual in each district designated as the central office contact is eligible for an annual 
performance incentive bonus of up to $2,000 based on an evaluation by the CP 
leadership and the superintendent as well as for their contribution toward building a 
learning community in their district (CIPP, 2010).  The central office contact is an 
assistant/associate superintendent or director at the district level designated to serve as 
the contact person for CP activities and communications.  Superintendents were eligible 
for deferred compensation of up to $30,000 plus interest ($10,000 per year for three 
years) based on five areas of criteria:  student performance, building a learning 
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community, leadership/support of school principals, leadership in the Collaborative 
Project, and teacher/principal retention (CIPP, 2010).  
 The Collaborative Project presents an opportunity for research on performance 
incentives at a time when interest in these initiatives is high.  As this researcher shows 
in the next section, an evaluation of the CP by the Carolina Institute of Public Policy has 
already exploited this opportunity to some degree, but important questions about the CP 
still remain.   
Brief Review of Prior Findings from CIPP Evaluation 
 In August of 2008, the leadership of the CP contracted with the Carolina Institute 
of Public Policy (CIPP) to formally evaluate the project. To date, CIPP has released 
three reports on the Collaborative Project.   
The first, a preliminary report, was released in February, 2009.  At that point in 
the implementation of the Collaborative Project and with limited data available, the 
researchers were unable to draw any conclusions regarding the impact of the 
performance incentives on teacher quality, teacher and administrator retention, or 
student achievement (CIPP, 2009a).  The evaluators were able to assess the design of 
the Collaborative Project and its subsequent implementation through the study of 
existing data and from interviews with teachers and administrators from the participating 
districts (CIPP, 2009a).  The evaluators reported that the strategies of the CP appeared 
well conceived to address goals and the challenges of the five participating districts as 
identified by the leadership of the districts (CIPP, 2009a).  Further, the evaluators 
identified areas of uneven implementation and snags in the implementation of the CP 
(CIPP, 2009a).  While the evaluators noted that the CP leadership had worked to 
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address challenges as they became apparent, they also warned that the report may 
identify new issues that would need to be addressed for the goals of the CP to be fully 
realized (CIPP, 2009a).  Overall, the evaluators found that the CP seemed well-
designed and on the road to a successful implementation (CIPP, 2009a). 
The second report, issued in June 2009, focused on the first two years of the CP 
(CIPP, 2009b). For the second report, the evaluators from CIPP had more data from 
which to work, including data from the five participating districts, NCDPI, data from three 
rounds of interviews conducted with stakeholders from the participating districts, and the 
results of an online survey of teachers (CIPP, 2009b).  The evaluators found the 
performance incentive component well designed, well implemented, and fully functional 
(CIPP, 2009b).  They noted that the system could be applied in any rural school district 
across the state (CIPP, 2009b).  Further, the evaluators mentioned that the leadership 
of the CP had “demonstrated an ability to continue adapting and refining the systems, 
based on experience, feedback from participating districts, and external evaluation” 
(CIPP, 2009b).  However, they noted that, despite modestly encouraging test score data 
from the participating districts, there was still work to be done in the third year of the 
pilot (CIPP, 2009b).  A substantial impact could not be documented in two years; 
therefore, data from the third year of the CP was needed (CIPP, 2009b). 
In June, 2010, the evaluators from CIPP released an assessment of the impact 
of the first two years of the CP (CIPP, 2009b).  As mentioned previously in the literature 
review, the data analyzed by the CIPP suggested that the components of the CP had 
not exerted a statistically significant overall effect on student achievement in the five 
participating districts (CIPP, 2010).  The CIPP evaluators did note that there were 
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“significant and sometimes quite striking links between participation in certain types of 
professional development and student achievement and between incentive awards and 
student achievement” over the first two years of the project (CIPP, 2010, p. i). In short, 
the CIPP evaluators found that students taught by teachers who earned higher 
performance incentive bonuses achieved larger gains on the EOG in mathematics than 
did students taught by teachers who earned lower performance incentive bonuses or no 
bonus at all (CIPP, 2010). Specifically, students taught by teachers who earned the 
maximum performance incentive ($500) in the student achievement component of the 
CP made significantly more progress on End-of-Grade (EOG) examinations than did 
students taught by teachers who earned no incentive award (CIPP, 2010).  The 
researchers also noted that students whose teachers received the maximum award 
($500) for the principal evaluation component made more progress on the EOG tests in 
mathematics than did students whose teachers received a smaller amount or no 
incentive award at all (CIPP 2010).  However, the maximum performance incentive 
award earned on the principal evaluation component was not associated with greater 
student achievement in the reading (CIPP, 2010).  Finally, the researchers noted that, in 
general, the level of incentive award for the parent and community contact component 
and the level of incentive award for participation in professional development were not 
associated with student achievement (CIPP, 2010). 
As indicated earlier, the CIPP evaluation of the Collaborative Project has 
contributed to our knowledge about the effects of performance incentives on student 
achievement and other school outcomes, but it leaves other important questions 
unanswered or only partially answered – including those presented at the beginning of 
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this chapter.  Through interviews with principals from participating districts in the CP, 
this researcher will document and examine the perceptions and opinions of principals to 
determine the challenges/dilemmas associated with the design and implementation of 
the CP from their point of view.  In the next section, this researcher explains why 
qualitative methods – interviews, specifically, are appropriate in addressing the research 
questions.   
Research Design 
Choice of Qualitative Approach 
Qualitative methods are appropriate to the research questions because they 
provide a way to create understanding of the stories of programs and participants 
(Patton, 2002).  Understanding these stories is useful because they can shed light on 
processes and outcomes for those who must make decisions about the programs 
(Patton, 2002).  For the purposes of this study, the stories of the participants’ 
experiences with the design and implementation of the performance incentive 
component of the Collaborative Project may help school administrators in the future 
make more informed decisions when designing and implementing performance 
incentive systems. The information the participants provide may also help school 
leaders decide whether or not they want to pursue a performance incentive program at 
all. 
According to Patton (2002), qualitative findings grow out of three types of data 
collection:  in-depth, open-ended interviews; direct observation; and written documents 
(2002).  Researchers interview subjects to learn those things that cannot be observed. 
The interview, which will be utilized in this study, is an appropriate method of qualitative 
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research because feelings, thoughts, and intentions cannot be observed by the 
researcher (Patton, 2002).  Interviews, according to Patton (2002), endeavor to capture 
perspectives of participants associated with the program.  Because of the open-ended 
nature of the research questions guiding this study of the challenges associated with the 
design and implementation of the performance incentives component of the CP, the 
interview is the most appropriate way to illuminate the participants’ (principals’) views.  
Through the interview, the researcher will document the perceptions of the principals 
related to the challenges associated with the design and implementation of the 
Collaborative Project. 
Main Data Collection Approach 
This study utilized the “Standardized Open-Ended Interview” (Patton, 2002).  
According to Patton, there are four main reasons for using this type of interview format 
(2002).  They are:   
1. The exact instrument used in the interview is available for inspection by those 
who may use the findings. 
2. Variation among interviewers can be minimized. 
3. The interview is more focused so interviewee time is used more efficiently. 
4. Analysis is facilitated by making responses easier to find and compare 
(Patton, 2002). 
Based on the above reasons, the interview is the most appropriate method for 
data collection for this study.  The interview instrument, presented in Appendix A, may 
be accessed by those wishing to use the instrument from this study in the future.  
Following a standardized format will allow for minimal variation among the interviewers 
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and will focus the interview for purposes of efficiency.  The standardized interview 
approach will also facilitate the analysis of the interviews.   
The open-ended format is useful when the researcher is aiming for clarification 
and interpretation from respondents who are knowledgeable about an experience or an 
issue (Patton, 2002).  Because of the open-ended nature of the research questions 
guiding this study of the challenges associated with the design and implementation of 
the performance incentives component of the CP, the interview is the most appropriate 
way to illuminate the participants’ (principals’) views.  Through an interview process with 
principals from participating districts in the CP, this researcher will document and 
examine the perceptions and opinions of principals to determine whether there were 
successes associated with the design and implementation of the CP that may not have 
been fully revealed during the quantitative analysis of the project performed by the 
Carolina Institute for Public Policy (CIPP).  The information that these principals may 
provide regarding the performance incentive component of the Collaborative Project 
may provide clarification and interpretation on a deeper level than the evaluation 
performed by the Carolina Institute for Public Policy – and the qualitative data collection 
method described above is best suited to that (Patton, 2002).  
Participants 
 The participants in the study will be principals from four of the five participating 
districts in the CP who served as principal of their school for at least two years of the 
three-year pilot.  The three principals from the fifth participating district, Greene County, 
will not be interviewed because of the researcher’s role as superintendent of the 
aforementioned district and the unique problems that role presents for the study.  To 
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remind the reader, there were twenty-four schools from five districts involved in the pilot; 
therefore, there are 24 total principals eligible to be interviewed.  With the removal of 
Greene County principals from the study, the number of potentially eligible principals is 
twenty-one (Greene County had three eligible principals). 
 Principals will be selected from the 2009-2010 North Carolina Public Schools 
Education Directory.  This publication is a listing of all the school systems and schools 
in North Carolina that the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction updates 
annually.  In this directory, the school districts of the state are listed in alphabetical 
order.  Further, the schools within those districts are listed alphabetically.  The name of 
the current principal at each school listed is a part of the information available in the 
directory.  Using this alphabetized directory, the researcher will invite the first four 
principals of eligible K-8 schools listed in each of the four participating districts to 
participate in the study.  If four principals from each of the four participating districts 
consent to participate, sixteen of the twenty-one eligible principals will have been 
interviewed (76% of the pool).  A number of principals who worked at one of the CP 
schools during the pilot years have vacated their positions for various reasons, including 
at least one retirement.  The researcher will endeavor to reach these principals to obtain 
his/her consent to be interviewed.  If one of the principals in the first four schools listed 
in the directory is no longer in place or does not consent to participate, the researcher 
will move to one of the remaining eligible CP principals listed alphabetically for that 
district.  As mentioned above, the total pool of potential participants (CP principals 
serving at least two years at a CP school during the three-year pilot) is twenty-one (21).  
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If it is not possible to locate a particular principal who served a CP school for more two 
or more years during the pilot, the total number of principals in the pool will be reduced. 
 Using the set of twenty-one CP schools, the sample will be stratified based on 
the level of school (elementary or middle) and then the sample will be randomly 
selected within each level using the method described above.  Therefore, the sampling 
approach for this study could be characterized as stratified random sampling (Patton, 
2002).   
Interview Design 
As mentioned previously, the standardized open-ended interview format will be 
utilized for the principal interviews.  Each of the principals who consented to be 
interviewed were asked a series of eight questions.  The questions included in the 
interview are comprised of two different types:  opinion and values questions and 
knowledge questions (Patton, 2002). The eight questions regarding the performance 
incentives associated with the Collaborative Project used in the interviews are listed in 
Appendix A. 
According to Patton (2002), opinion and values questions are questions aimed at 
understanding the cognitive and interpretative processes of people ask about opinions, 
judgments, and values as opposed to actions and behaviors.  Answers to these 
questions tell us what some people think about an experience or issue (Patton, 2002).  
Knowledge questions inquire about the respondent’s factual information – what the 
respondent knows about an experience or issue (Patton, 2002).  
 The interviews with the principals from Caswell, Mitchell, Warren, and 
Washington Counties will be conducted over the telephone during a single call lasting 
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no more than one hour.  The interviews will be recorded and then used as a basis for 
the creation of field notes by the researcher.   To remind the reader, the three principals 
from Greene County will not be interviewed because of the researcher’s role as 
superintendent of that district and the unique problems that role presents for the study. 
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 Each of the interviews will be recorded by the researcher and used as a basis for 
writing up field notes.  All of the principals’ responses to each question will be reviewed, 
question by question.  For each question, the main types of responses will be identified.  
A table will be constructed showing the main types of responses for each question, the 
number of principals who spoke to or voiced each type of response, and two or three 
short quotes illustrating each type of response.  During the analysis for each question, 
the findings will be compared with the survey data from the June, 2009 program 
evaluation completed by CIPP for triangulation purposes.  Finally, a summary table will 
be created to identify more general patterns in the responses overall.  A summary of the 
findings will then be written. 
Limitations 
 The Collaborative Project districts and schools are not chosen randomly from the 
larger population of schools in North Carolina.  Thus, the researcher will not be able to 
generalize findings in any rigorous way to other school and districts.  But placing 
findings from the study in the context of existing research on the topic should enable the 
researcher to suggest what some of the wider implications may be.   
 The researcher is a participant in the Collaborative Project; therefore, this study 
represents a type of participant observation.  Also, the researcher’s role as 
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superintendent of a participating district presents unique problems for the study.  To 
accommodate any issues, the principals from Greene County will not be interviewed. 
 In an effort to overcome problems associated with reliance upon one method of 
data collection, the researcher will use the findings from the June 2009 CIPP teacher 
survey to complement and cross-check results of the interviews with the principals.   
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, the researcher has restated the research questions, provided 
some background on the Collaborative Project, showed how the present study will build 
on and complement the evaluation being conducted by the Carolina Institute for Public 
Policy, and elaborated on the research design, including the main data collection 
approach, participants, interview design and protocol, and data analysis and 
interpretation.  The researcher also discussed the limitations and special challenges of 
this particular study.  In the next chapter, the findings will be presented. 
  
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  DATA ANALYSIS 
 The objective of this study, as stated in Chapter one, was to determine, through 
an interview process with principals involved in the Collaborative Project, successes, 
challenges, and dilemmas faced within five North Carolina school districts during the 
development and implementation of a performance incentive program.  
 As stated in Chapter three, the participants in the study were principals from four 
of the five participating districts in the CP who served as principal of their school for at 
least two years of the three-year pilot.  The three eligible principals from the fifth 
participating district, Greene County, were not interviewed because of the researcher’s 
role as superintendent of the aforementioned district and the unique problems that role 
presented for the study.  To remind the reader, there were twenty-four schools from five 
districts involved in the pilot; therefore, there are 24 total principals eligible to be 
interviewed.  With the removal of Greene County principals from the study, the number 
of potentially eligible principals is twenty-one (Greene County had three eligible 
principals).  Of the twenty-one potentially eligible principals, 17 served as principal of 
their school for at least two years of the three-year pilot; therefore, 17 principals were 
interviewed. 
 This chapter presents the analysis of the data collected by the researcher from 
the interviews with the CP principals. The interviews were recorded and used as a basis 
for the creation of field notes by the researcher. All of the principals’ responses to each 
question were reviewed, question by question.  For each question, the main types of 
responses were identified.  A table was constructed showing the main types of 
responses for each question, the number of principals who spoke to or voiced each type 
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of response, and two or three short quotes illustrating each type of response.  During 
the analysis for each applicable question, the findings were compared with the survey 
data from the June, 2009 program evaluation completed by CIPP for triangulation 
purposes.   
Interview Question #1 
 The first question of the eight posed to the principals during the interview process 
sought to determine whether principals felt the student achievement component of the 
performance incentive system helped, hurt, or had no effect on the school in which the 
interviewee was principal.  Thirteen of the seventeen (76%) felt the student 
achievement component helped his/her school, 2 principals (12%) believed the 
component had no effect on his/her schools, and 2 principals (12%) opined that the 
component hurt his/her school (see Table 5). 
 The principals who believed that the student achievement component helped the 
school gave varying answers for why he/she responded in that way.  Most believed the 
component encouraged teachers to make more and better use of student testing data 
and motivated teachers to take a serious look at their instructional practice.  Several 
principals attributed an increase in collaboration among teachers to the student 
achievement component.  For example, across multiple schools and districts, principals 
noted that teachers of non-tested subjects/grades voluntarily tutored students during 
school hours and/or after school.  Before the implementation of this component, these 
teachers had not volunteered to assist struggling students.  Other principals believed 
the student achievement component of the performance incentive system was 
responsible for the school meeting state and national proficiency targets.   
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Table 5 
 
Principals’ Responses to Question 1 
 
 
Response 
No. of 
Principals 
Pct. of 
Principals 
 
Reasons/Supporting Quotes 
    
Helped 
school 
13 76% “It gave the teachers a little added bonus 
for going forward as far as trying to make 
sure that students did hit those marks.”  
“Even those teachers who did not teach a 
tested grade were inspired to do all that 
they can do as far as helping out.”  “It 
made my teachers look at what they are 
doing differently.”  “It pushed my teachers 
to do better and get those kids where they 
were supposed to be.” 
    
No effect on 
school 
2 12% “My staff gives all they’ve got anyway and 
that area didn’t change that.”  “The amount 
of money for that component was not 
enough to motivate teachers to improve 
their practice.” 
    
Hurt school 2 12% One principal stated that, because of a 
high population of students with 
disabilities, it was difficult for the school to 
reach AYP targets; therefore, this 
component hurt the school.  Another 
mentioned that the component harmed 
morale in the school because teachers in 
non-tested grades/areas received more 
incentive than some teachers of tested 
subjects/grades. 
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 The two principals who indicated the student achievement component of the CP 
had no effect on his/her school gave two different reasons for why he/she responded 
that way.  The first principal indicated that he had a staff that puts forth maximum effort 
all the time, and the student achievement component did not change that.  The second 
principal indicated that $500 was not enough of a financial incentive to motivate his/her 
teachers to improve their instructional practice. 
Two principals felt that the student achievement component of the performance 
incentive system hurt his/her school, and both provided different reasons.  The first 
principal pointed out that his/her school housed a higher population of students with 
disabilities that others.  Because of that, the principal believed it was more difficult for 
the school to meet national proficiency targets; therefore, his teachers could not receive 
the maximum performance incentive in that component.  Although not explicitly stated 
by the principal, the principal’s statements appeared to indicate that teachers in this 
principal’s school were rankled by being offered an incentive to do something they felt 
they could not do.  The second principal cited a morale issue stemming from an 
anomaly with the student achievement component mentioned by the Carolina Institute 
for Public Policy on pp. 25-26 in the June, 2009 report.  The principal indicated morale 
was harmed in the school because teachers in non-tested grades/areas received more 
performance incentive than some teachers of tested subjects/grades.  This anomaly 
was directly addressed in the interview with all principals in questions 5 and 6. 
Interview Question #2 
 The second question posed to the principals sought to determine whether 
principals felt the principal’s evaluation component of the CP helped, hurt, or had no 
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effect on the school in which the interviewee was principal.  Slightly more than half of 
the 17 principals (53%) felt the principal’s evaluation component helped his/her school 
and 8 principals (47%) believed the component had no effect on his/her schools.  None 
of the principals interviewed believed that the component hurt his/her school (see Table 
6). 
 The principals who believed that the principal’s evaluation component helped the 
school gave several answers for why he/she responded in that way.  Several principals 
believed the principal’s evaluation component motivated the teachers to go “the extra 
mile” and work harder to get the performance incentive.  At least one principal 
mentioned that teachers did not want to be “the one” not to get the bonus.  Others 
mentioned the personal effect the component had on them.  For example, at least two 
principals admitted the component forced them to take the evaluations more seriously 
than they had before and to be more thoughtful with them.  Yet another principal 
mentioned that he/she spent more time with teachers to be sure everyone he/she 
evaluated knew what he/she saw as satisfactory versus above average performance. 
 The principals who felt that the principal’s evaluation component had no effect on 
the school also gave several reasons for why he/she responded that way.  Multiple 
principals in this category indicated that the teachers’ priority was the student 
achievement component, not the principal’s evaluation component; therefore, very little 
emphasis was placed on the principal’s evaluation.  Many also responded that they did 
not change the way they evaluated their teachers as a result of the CP.    
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Table 6 
 
Principals’ Responses to Question 2 
 
 
Response 
No. of 
Principals 
Pct. of 
Principals 
 
Reasons/Supporting Quotes 
    
Helped 
school 
9 53% “As a principal, it really made me look 
thoroughly into, you know, assessing the 
teachers – really looking into what was 
satisfactory.”  “I found myself working with 
teachers more to let them know what I saw 
as expected, what I saw as above 
average.  I think I did more of that during 
the Collaborative because it forced me to.” 
“Teachers started to realize that their 
observations meant something, that it 
wasn’t just a procedure that they went 
through every so often.  That what they got 
on that really counted.” 
    
No effect on 
school 
8 47% “The teachers in my school were going to 
get rated however they got rated anyway.”  
“I didn’t change the way I was evaluating 
my teachers from the way I done it in the 
past.  If they do their job, they do their 
job…I don’t know any other way to say it.”  
“I was always one who probably gave 
teachers higher than they deserve anyway 
so it really didn’t change my thinking.”  
“Principals always strive for improvement.  
There were several other things more 
important for our success than the 
principal’s evaluation.” 
    
Hurt school 0 0%  
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Interview Question #3 
 The third question of the eight posed to the principals during the interview 
process dealt with inflated ratings of teachers on the principal’s evaluations.  Despite 
serving in schools with serious student achievement challenges, almost all principals 
continued to assign teachers inflated ratings.  The reasons provided by the principals for 
this phenomenon were varied and interesting (see Table 7). 
 The first of the six reasons principals primarily gave for inflating ratings to 
teachers dealt with the teacher evaluation form itself.  The form, issued by the 
Department of Public Instruction (DPI), did not address student achievement in any of 
the elements.  Therefore, a teacher could satisfactorily meet all the requirements listed 
on the form and have less than satisfactory student achievement outcomes.  The June, 
2009 CIPP report addresses this very issue (p. 27) and mentions that the new 
evaluation instrument, mandatory for use in North Carolina in the 2010-11 school year, 
does indeed address student achievement.  However, for the first three years of the CP, 
the older evaluation instrument that did not address student achievement was used to 
evaluate teachers in the CP school districts.   
 The second reason provided suggests that principals gave inflated ratings to 
keep morale of the faculty high.  At least two of the principals interviewed suggested this 
as a reason, but both principals claimed to be describing other principals in the district 
and not themselves.   
 The third reason principals gave for continuing to assign teachers with inflated 
ratings was to reward teachers for hard work rather than test results.  Multiple principals  
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Table 7 
Principals’ Responses to Question 3 
 
Reason Supporting Quotes 
  
The DPI-issued teacher evaluation form 
did not include student achievement – it 
looked at other variables. 
“I think you’re looking at factors other than 
performance scores.  Growth doesn’t always 
show in numbers.”  “I think a lot of it has to 
do with the totality of understanding what the 
principal has versus others who may see 
things somewhat in isolation such as data.”  
“To me, there’s a lot more than teaching to 
the test if you want to call it that.  There’s a 
lot more to a teacher’s role than whether a 
kid makes a 3 or a 4.”   
  
Principals gave inflated ratings to 
maintain high staff morale. 
“Principals used it as a self-esteem type 
thing.”  “Some principals gave inflated ratings 
so the staff could feel good about 
themselves.” 
  
Principals rewarded teachers for hard 
work rather than results. 
“Our teachers work their butts off here.”  “I 
rated my teachers high because, darn it, I felt 
like they deserved it regardless of how the 
scores fell.” 
  
The principals and the teachers knew 
that money was attached to the 
evaluations – pressure on the principals. 
“The teachers see poor ratings as me taking 
money out of their pockets.” 
  
The principals viewed the ratings as an 
opportunity to get some more money for 
his/her teachers. 
“I did anything I could to help the teachers 
get more money because of the economy.”  
“We’re taking everything else in the world 
from them so here’s a chance to give 
something back.” 
  
Principals gave inflated ratings in turn 
for good Teacher Working Conditions 
Survey results. 
“I think it was a situation where we’re going 
to help you, we need you to help us.  I’ll 
scratch your back, you scratch mine.”  “I think 
he thought if I do this, they’re going to do this 
for me.”  “I think initially we probably all 
thought that if we helped them that in turn 
that would help us in the long run, you know, 
if we over-inflated their evaluations in the 
long run it would help us, I think.” 
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mentioned that his/her staff worked very hard and deserved high ratings based on effort 
alone. 
 The fourth reason principals used to defend high ratings assigned to teachers 
was pressure from teachers.  The principal who gave this reason indicated that both 
principals and teachers knew there was money attached to the evaluations and that 
teachers in his/her school saw a poor rating as “taking money out of my pocket.”  The 
principal hinted that the pressure to inflate teacher ratings was too much to bear. 
 Several principals viewed the principal’s evaluation component as a way to help 
provide extra money for his/her teachers at a time when teachers had not seen a raise 
in several years, the economy had taken a downturn, and the state cut bonuses for 
student growth.  There was no quid pro quo evidenced from these principals – just a 
genuine attempt to secure more money for the teachers in the school. 
 The final, and perhaps most interesting, reason given by principals for inflating 
teacher ratings was the exchange of inflated teacher evaluation ratings for inflated 
ratings on the Teacher Working Conditions Survey (TWC), which affected the 
performance incentives available to the principals themselves.  Four principals (24%) of 
the 17 interviewed either explicitly acknowledged a quid pro quo between teacher 
evaluation ratings and the TWC or mentioned it indirectly.  Even more interesting is the 
fact that the two principals who mentioned the quid pro quo directly are in the same 
district.  Two others acknowledged that they knew of the arrangement – one of those is 
in the same district as the two who acknowledged the quid pro quo directly.   
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Interview Question #4 
 The fourth question posed to the principals sought to determine whether 
principals felt the professional development component of the CP helped, hurt, or had 
no effect on the school in which the interviewee was principal.  Falling in line with the 
enthusiasm with which teachers responded to this component in the June, 2009 CIPP 
report (p. 26), 15 principals (88%) responded that he/she felt the professional 
development component helped their schools.  Only one principal (6%) responded that 
the component had no effect on the school and one (6%) responded that the 
component hurt the school (see Table 8). 
 The principals who believed the professional development component of the CP 
helped his/her school were very enthusiastic in their reasoning, and the high number of 
principals who felt the professional development component helped his/her school are 
supported by the research.  As mentioned in Chapter two, it appears to be best practice 
to include a component in a performance incentive initiative that rewards teachers for 
attending/completing professional development that is relevant to school and district 
goals (Center for Teaching Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Perkins-
Gough, 2007).  The inclusion of such in a performance incentive system for teachers is 
one of the generally agreed upon components of a successful performance incentive 
system (Center for Teaching Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; 
Perkins-Gough, 2007). 
 Almost all principals mentioned the high level of quality of the professional 
development.  More than one principal noted that teachers originally attended the 
sessions for the money but stayed for the quality. 
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Table 8 
 
Principals’ Responses to Question 4 
 
 
Response 
No. of 
Principals 
Pct. of 
Principals 
 
Reasons/Supporting Quotes 
    
Helped 
school 
15 88% “I absolutely think it was the best piece of 
the Collaborative Project.”  “For many 
teachers, it was job and subject specific 
and applicable.”  “We were all looking at 
the same page, doing the same thing, 
talking the same vocabulary with the same 
kinds of motivations to get things done.  
First time I’ve ever seen that.”  “The topics 
that were covered were directly related to 
what we were trying to do in our schools.” 
    
No effect on 
school 
1 6% “Most of my teachers live 30 to 40 miles 
from here.  They weren’t up for the 
weekend classes but they tried to get as 
many days in the summer as they could.” 
    
Hurt school 1 6% “The teachers did not participate as they 
should have.  The ones who did, did well.” 
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development offered through the CP gave them access to training to which they would 
not otherwise have had access or been able to afford to have on their own.  Other 
principals mentioned the timeliness of the training in light of the elimination of 
professional development funding by the state.  A few principals addressed an issue 
with the distance; specifically, some rural locations had too far to travel to cities for 
professional development.  The CP allowed the professional development to come to 
the teachers.  Specific professional development offerings mentioned by principals 
included Thinking Maps, Seven Habits of Highly Effective Teachers, and Lenses on 
Learning.   
 The single principal that indicated the professional development component had 
no effect on his/her school answered that way only because of the lack of participation 
of his teachers in the Saturday professional development offerings.  The principal 
mentioned the distance most of the faculty had to drive to get to the school as the main 
reason for this phenomenon, but he/she noted that participation picked up for the 
summer offerings.   
 The lack of participation by teachers also seemed to be the reason why a 
principal answered that the professional development component hurt his/her school.  
He/she indicated that only approximately a quarter of his/her staff participated in the 
offerings, but the principal did indicate that those teachers who did participate did well. 
Interview Question #5 
 The fifth question of the interview protocol for the CP principals addressed an 
anomaly discovered by the CIPP pertaining to the student achievement component of 
the performance incentive system.  The anomaly revolves around the few teachers of 
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tested subjects/grades who received less student achievement performance incentive 
than did some teachers of non-tested subjects/grades.  The issue is addressed in the 
June, 2009 report issued by the CIPP (pp. 25-26).  The question asked principals if any 
teachers complained about this anomaly in his/her school.  Only six of the seventeen 
principals indicated that teachers had complained to them regarding this phenomenon 
(35% of the principals).  The remaining eleven principals (65%) did not receive any 
complaints of this nature (see Table 9). 
  For the principals who indicated this was an issue in their schools, there were 
follow-up questions.  The first asked the principals if the issue was widespread.  None of 
the principals felt the issue was widespread.  One principal had two of twenty teachers 
(10%) complain to him about the anomaly.  No other principal had more than two 
teachers complain.   
 The second follow-up question asked the principals to explain how he/she 
addressed the issue with the disgruntled teacher.  Each of the six principals indicated 
that they sat down with the teachers in question and went over the criteria using the 
teacher’s individual results.  By doing so, they were able to reach a level of equilibrium 
amongst the faculty once again. 
 At first glance, this finding that 35% of principals reported teacher complaints 
regarding the student achievement component rebuts the June, 2009 CIPP finding that 
only 13% of teachers found the incentive payments to be a source of irritation (p. 24).  
However, if one takes into account the total number of teachers that complained (9 
teachers) versus the total number of teachers in CP schools, the CIPP finding appears 
to be validated.  
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Table 9 
Principals’ Responses to Question 5 
 
 
Response 
No. of 
Principals 
Pct. of 
Principals 
 
Supporting Quotes/Reasons 
    
Yes 6 35% “The teacher felt if the school received 
$300 or $400, then she should have 
received at least that much.”  “I won’t say 
they so much complained as just said they 
didn’t think it was fair that somebody 
wasn’t even teaching a tested subject was 
receiving the funding.”   
    
No 11 65% One principal mentioned the problem was 
not within the school at the teacher level - 
it was a school-to-school problem within 
the district. 
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 One interesting finding did arise when a principal mentioned that the problem 
he/she experienced was not teacher-to-teacher but rather school-to-school within a 
district.  There was some conflict when one CP school outperformed another in one 
district.  In that instance, teachers who did not teach tested subjects/grades at the better 
performing school received more incentive pay than the other school, which led to some 
grumbling that the principal felt obligated to address. 
Interview Question #6 
 The sixth question posed to principals was a follow-up to the fifth question.  The 
principals were asked whether the exclusion of teachers of non-tested subjects/grades 
from the student achievement component would have helped or hurt his/her school.  
Not surprisingly, 16 of the 17 principals (94%) felt the exclusion of teachers of non-
tested subjects/grades would have hurt the school.  One principal (6%) responded that 
it would have had no effect on his/her school (see Table 10).   
 In addressing this issue, most principals acknowledged that all teachers 
contribute to the success of the school.  Many principals noted that teachers of non-
tested subjects/grades tutored and worked after school to help ensure the school met its 
goals.  Many principals also admitted such an arrangement would likely have caused 
major morale problems within their schools.  This admission supports the June, 2009 
CIPP finding that 69% of the teacher polled indicated that the CP performance 
incentives boost school morale (p. 24).  
 The one principal who felt the move would have had no effect on the school 
admitted there would be some discontent initially, but that as long as the teachers had 
the access to the professional development, they would “have been fine with that.” 
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Table 10 
 
Principals’ Responses to Question 6 
 
 
Response 
No. of 
Principals 
Pct. of 
Principals 
 
Supporting Quotes/Reasons 
    
Hurt school 16 94% “I think it would have caused some 
dissension among the ranks.”  “Our staff is 
a family.  The same team with the same 
dream.”  “Teamwork makes the dream 
work.”  “Not only were they expected to 
make a contribution, they were willing to 
find ways to contribute to the success of 
the overall school.” 
    
No effect on 
school 
1 6% “I think there would have been some 
grumbling.  If they had been able to take 
the staff development, but not got paid for 
the student achievement, I think 90% of 
my guys would have been fine with that.” 
    
Helped 
school 
0 0%  
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 One interesting finding did arise from this question.  In at least one school, the 
grade levels pooled their money for student achievement and split it equally amongst all 
in that grade level so that each teacher in that particular grade level received the same 
amount. 
Interview Question #7 
 The penultimate question asked of the principals had two distinct parts.  The first 
part asked principals if they agreed with a statement made in the June, 2009 CIPP 
report that indicated that superintendents, central office contacts, and principals from all 
five participating districts confirmed that they had been “fully involved” (p. 23) in the 
process for determining the performance incentive criteria.  Seven principals answered 
positively (41%), four principals responded negatively (24%), and the other six 
principals (35%) were indecisive and provided a qualified response (see Table 11).  
 There appeared to be a significant amount of overlap in the responses of the 
principals regardless of how they answered the question.  All of the principals who were 
part of the CP for the first two Leadership Institutes agreed that they participated fully in 
the development of the criteria.  It is after the first two Leadership Institutes that opinions 
began to change.  Two of the principals who answered positively noted that their 
answers covered the first two Leadership Institutes only.  Likewise, all of the 6 principals 
who would not choose either answer agreed they were involved for the first two 
Leadership Institutes.  After those first two Leadership Institutes, the principals felt less 
involved or not involved at all.  One principal mentioned that the CP leadership “guided 
things the way they wanted it to go.”  Of the four principals who responded to the 
question negatively, two did so because they joined the CP in Year 2 and were not a 
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Table 11 
Principals’ Responses to Question 7 – Part 1 
 
 
Response 
No. of 
Principals 
Pct. of 
Principals 
 
Supporting Quotes/Reasons 
    
Yes 7 41% “I didn’t expect all of my personal feelings 
about it to necessarily be what the end 
result yielded but I do think just the fact 
that I had a chance to share and be able to 
throw it out made me feel like I had 
participated.”  “We tossed that thing 
around quite a bit and in the end someone 
had to make a call based on all those 
conversations.” 
    
No 4 24% “We didn’t attend those executive 
meetings and stuff like that.  A lot of 
decisions were made that we weren’t a 
part of.”  “The principals weren’t…we had 
some input early on.”  “I don’t know if the 
principals were ever in another meeting 
after the first two where it was discussed 
at length.”   
    
Other 6 35% “The principals were involved with doing it 
for the teachers – that’s all I can say about 
it.” “I’m sure there were more discussions 
in your meetings that we weren’t a part of.” 
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part of the first two Leadership Institutes.  The other two noted mixed feelings after the 
first two Leadership Institutes.   
 The significant finding here is that all principals who participated in the first two 
Leadership Institutes felt fully involved in the process for determining the performance 
incentive criteria no matter how they answered the question.  The feelings are mixed, if 
not negative, for their level of participation after those first two Leadership Institutes 
when the Advisory Committee, made up of CP leadership, the superintendent and 
central office contact from each district, took over the tweaking of the criteria.  In 
Chapter Two, the researcher noted that there is agreement in the body of reviewed 
literature on specific components of a performance incentive system in education that 
increase the likelihood of a successful program (Center for Teaching Quality, 2007; 
Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Perkins-Gough, 2007).  Among these are including 
stakeholders in the planning and implementation of new performance incentive 
programs (Center for Teaching Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; 
Perkins-Gough, 2007).  Further, the inclusion of these stakeholders in the planning and 
implementation of performance incentive initiatives appears to be crucial; in most failed 
attempts, stakeholders were not included in the planning and implementation of the 
programs (Center for Teaching Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; 
Perkins-Gough, 2007). 
 The second part of the seventh question asked principals if they thought the 
stakeholders of the CP had created performance incentive criteria that successfully 
blended high standards with achievability.  Eleven principals answered positively (65%) 
and six principals responded negatively (35%)(see Table 12). 
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Table 12 
 
Principals’ Responses to Question 7 – Part 2 
 
 
Response 
No. of 
Principals 
Pct. of 
Principals 
 
Supporting Quotes/Reasons 
    
Yes 11 65% “We gave them something to shoot for that 
they knew they could reach.”  “If I were a 
teacher and I looked at those four areas 
that I could receive a bonus in, I don’t think 
there’s a single one…even if the whole 
school didn’t make growth, if I remember 
correctly, if my classroom made 80% I still 
could get my money whether anybody else 
did nor not.” 
    
No 6 35% “The all or none was not achievable in the 
Building a Learning Community category.”  
“The percentage of teachers participating 
in the professional development was not 
achievable and we had no leverage to 
make them attend, yet we were held 
accountable for that number.”  
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 Overall, the principals felt that the stakeholders in the CP created a set of 
performance incentive criteria that balanced high standards with achievability.  Most of 
the dissension came from the criteria for principals and superintendents regarding the 
percentage of teachers attending professional development.  Another principal noted 
that the parent contact component, while valuable, was not a high standard.  
 CIPP, in its June, 2009 report, noted that 72% of teachers polled felt that the 
incentive criteria are well designed and linked to criteria that make sense (p. 24).  That 
finding supports the above finding suggesting that 65% of principals agreed that CP 
stakeholders created criteria that blended high standards with achievability.   
 Two interesting findings came out of this interview question.  The first deals again 
with the issue of quid pro quo in education.  One principal, in a discussion of the 
percentage of teachers attending professional development, noted that her teachers 
began to attend sessions once they found out she was paid based on the number of 
teachers who attended professional development.  The principal said, “Now a lot of 
mine eventually did because they knew it would help me…I mean I don’t know if you’re 
going to put that in your report or not but a lot of them said I’m gonna go because I 
know it would help you.” 
 The second interesting finding came from a principal who answered the question 
positively but noted that, “we set high average standards as opposed to high categorical 
standards.”  The principal further explained that high average standards lump all 
students together while high categorical standards look specifically at one category of 
students (students with disabilities, gifted students, etc.).  The principal did admit that 
categorical standards were not realistic for this project. 
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Interview Question #8 
 The final question asked principals whether they observed instances of teachers 
using the performance incentives associated with the CP to drive up their final average 
salary for retirement in his/her school.  Four principals (24%) of the seventeen noted 
they had observed this phenomenon.  Table 13 outlines the responses of the four 
principals who responded positively (see Table 13). 
 While nearly a quarter of the CP principals interviewed observed this 
phenomenon, the total number of teachers who used the CP to drive up their final 
average salary for retirement is very small.  None of the four principals who reported 
observing the phenomenon reported that his/her teacher retention rate was negatively 
affected.  It is interesting to note that principal #4 above lost three teachers to this 
phenomenon out of 15 total teachers, which equates to 20% of the teaching staff.  The 
principal responded that he/she was unsure whether or not the teacher retention rate 
was negatively affected.  However, it almost certainly had to be with 20% of the faculty 
retiring after using the CP to drive up their final average salary.  The teacher retention 
rate for a particular school is based on the number of teachers who leave during the 
school year for any reason.  If 20% of the teachers of a school leave for any reason, the 
retention rate would be negatively impacted.  
Summary of Findings 
 Questions one, two, and four  asked principals about three of the four 
components (student achievement, principal’s evaluation, and professional 
development) of the performance incentive criteria for teachers associated with the CP 
and whether they felt the component helped, hurt, or had no effect on their school.  
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Table 13 
Principals’ Responses to Question 8 
 
 
Principal 
Phenomenon 
Observed 
Number of 
Teachers 
Better 
Teachers? 
Phenomenon Affect 
Retention Rate? 
     
#1 Yes 1 No No 
     
#2 Yes 1 No No 
     
#3 Yes 1 Yes No 
     
#4 Yes 3 Yes Not sure 
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Overall, the majority of principals (37/51 principals or 73%) interviewed believed the 
components helped his/her school.  The fourth and final component of the performance 
incentive criteria for teachers, parental contacts, was not a part of the interview protocol.   
 The third question asked principals why he/she felt principals participating in the 
CP continued to assign inflated ratings to teachers in schools that had, and continue to 
have, issues with poor student achievement on state-mandated testing.  Among the 
reasons provided by principals were: 
• The teacher evaluation form issued by DPI did not address student 
achievement 
• The need to keep faculty morale high. 
• A desire to reward teachers for hard work rather than the test results of 
his/her students. 
• Pressure from teachers to relate to the funding attached to the evaluation. 
• A desire to provide extra money to his/her teachers. 
• A quid pro quo – principals assigned overly inflated teacher evaluation ratings 
in exchange for favorable ratings on the Teacher Working Conditions Survey. 
 Questions 5 and 6 were related to the issue noted by CIPP evaluators regarding 
teachers complaining about teachers of non-tested subjects receiving more financial 
reward than teachers of tested subjects in some cases.  While six principals (35%) 
reported receiving teacher complaints in this area, the total number of teachers 
complaining about the issue (9) was still very small compared to the total number of CP 
teachers in the five districts.  However, the finding from this study related to the tested 
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teachers versus non-tested teachers issue is supported by the findings of CIPP in its 
June, 2009 report. 
 Question 6 was a follow-up question that asked principals if the decision to 
exclusion of teachers of non-tested subjects from the performance incentive for student 
achievement would have helped or hurt the school.  All but one of the principals (94%) 
agreed that excluding teachers on non-tested subjects/grades would have hurt the 
school. 
 The seventh question contained two parts. The first part of the question asked 
principals about his/her level of participation in the determination of the performance 
incentive criteria for the various CP stakeholders.  This question featured the most 
mixed results of any of the eight questions.  Seven principals (41%) believed they 
participated fully, four principals (24%) felt they were not fully involved, and six others 
(35%) did not answer “yes” or “no” but qualified his/her response with an explanation.  
Most principals believed they were fully involved in the process to determine the 
performance incentive criteria for the first two Leadership Institutes.  After that point, the 
CP leadership began to use an Advisory Committee made up of the CP leadership, and 
the superintendent and central office contact from each of the five districts.  Because of 
the Advisory Committee, the principals felt his/her full involvement diminished 
significantly. 
 The second part of the seventh question asked principals if they believed the 
performance criteria created by the stakeholders of the CP balanced high standards 
with achievability.  Most of the principals interviewed (65%) believed the criteria 
successfully blended high standards with achievability. 
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 The final question dealt with the phenomenon of teachers using the performance 
incentives associated with the CP to drive up their final average salary for retirement.  
Only four principals (24%) noted that they had observed this phenomenon in their 
schools.   
 The fifth and final chapter of this study includes a thorough discussion of the 
conclusions related to the guiding questions, the implications of the findings, 
recommendations for further research and a summary of the chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER FIVE:  CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the study’s main findings and their 
implications for school leaders wishing to design and implement performance incentive 
programs in schools. To remind the reader, one shortcoming in the literature is the lack 
of a research-based prescription describing how performance pay initiatives should be 
designed (Podgursky & Springer, 2007; Ritter & Jensen, 2010).  Understanding the 
perceptions of the principals associated with the Collaborative Project (CP) about the 
design and implementation of the performance incentives may be extremely beneficial 
to educational researchers and policymakers alike.  The findings from this study may 
also help school leaders decide whether they want to pursue a performance incentive 
program at all. 
This chapter is organized into four sections, beginning with the conclusions 
related to the guiding questions.  The implications of the findings are provided in the 
second section of this chapter.  The third section offers recommendations for further 
research, and the final section summarizes the chapter. 
Conclusions Related to Guiding Questions 
 In order to understand the implications of the findings of this study for school 
leaders, one must begin with the questions used to guide the study: 
1. What are the major challenges and dilemmas for school leaders in designing 
a performance incentive system for individual teachers? 
2. How did the leadership of the Collaborative Project address the challenges 
and dilemmas that arose during the implementation of the performance 
incentive system?
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3. How did principals, teachers, and others involved in the implementation 
respond to the design of the Collaborative Project? 
a. To what degree were the responses positive? 
b. To what degree were the responses negative? 
c. What unforeseen challenges or dilemmas emerged during 
implementation? 
4. What are the implications for school leaders of the Collaborative Project’s 
experience in designing and implementing a performance incentive system 
for individual teachers for future efforts to create performance incentive 
systems designed to improve student achievement?   
 The first guiding question addresses the major challenges and dilemmas for 
school leaders in designing a performance incentive system for individual teachers.  
One major challenge for school leaders is the creation of performance incentive criteria 
that may avoid opportunities for quid pro quos amongst the stakeholders.  A surprising 
finding arose from the principals’ answers to the third interview question dealing with 
reasons why they continued to assign teachers inflated evaluation ratings.  Several 
principals admitted to a quid pro quo during the interview process; in other words, the 
principal exchanged inflated ratings on a teacher evaluation, which provided a 
performance incentive for teachers, in return for favorable ratings from the teacher on 
the Teacher Working Conditions Survey, which offered an opportunity for an incentive 
award for the principal.  At least two principals admitted to this type of a quid pro quo.  
There may have been other principals who engaged in this type of quid pro quo; 
however, no others admitted to such during the interview.  This finding presents an 
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ethical dilemma as well.  How prevalent were quid pro quos in schools before the CP?  
Is this type of quid pro quo a breach of professional ethics?  Is this type of quid pro quo 
illegal?  If it is illegal, where is the line between legal and illegal and is it clearly defined?  
Are quid pro quos such as this common in the private sector?  These questions and 
perhaps others regarding quid pro quos in education are certainly areas that are ripe for 
future study.   
 A second challenge that was first identified during a more formal evaluation 
released by the Carolina Institute for Public Policy (CIPP) in June, 2009 and validated 
by this study found that there were instances of teachers of tested subjects/grades 
receiving less performance incentive for student achievement than some teachers of 
non-tested subjects/grades.  Six of the 17 principals (35%) reported at least one teacher 
complaining about this phenomenon during the interviews. While six principals (35%) 
reported receiving teacher complaints in this area, the total number of teachers 
complaining about the issue (9) was still very small compared to the total number of CP 
teachers in the five districts; therefore, the phenomenon did not appear to be 
widespread.  Another interesting aspect of this finding relates to how the principals 
addressed the issue with the teachers.  Each of the six principals who reported a 
teacher complaint in this area indicated that he/she sat down with the teacher making 
the complaint and went over the criteria with the teacher individually.  All of the 
principals noted that sitting down the teacher individually appeared to resolve the issue.  
Interestingly enough, despite the few complaints, almost all of the principals (94%) felt 
that designing the student achievement component of the teacher performance 
incentive criteria would have harmed the school.  One principal who received 
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complaints from teachers stated very succinctly that, “I think the way they did it was the 
only fair way.”  Thirteen of the seventeen principals (76%) interviewed believed the 
student achievement component of the teacher performance incentive criteria helped 
the school; therefore, the implication for school leaders is to include the student 
achievement component for all teachers in future iterations of performance incentive 
programs.  The caveat is for the stakeholders of the performance incentive programs to 
develop very clear criteria so that when anomalies occur, school leaders may fall back 
on the criteria.  
 The final challenge for school leaders attempting to design a performance 
incentive program for teachers is that, despite the teacher recruitment and/or retention 
focus of many performance incentive programs, leaders must understand that some 
teachers will use the incentives for other purposes.  In other words, nearly a quarter of 
the principals interviewed noted that at least one teacher in the building used the 
incentives associated with the CP to drive up his/her final average salary for retirement.  
In about half of the recorded instances, these teachers were better teachers within the 
school.  However, the principals reported that teacher retention rates were not greatly 
impacted by this phenomenon. 
 The second guiding question asked how the leadership of the CP addressed 
challenges that arose during the implementation of the performance incentive program.  
The best example, already noted, was the way the principals who received complaints 
from teachers of tested subjects about the student achievement performance incentive 
handled the concerns.  In each of the six incidents, the principals responded in the 
same manner.  Each sat down with the individual teacher and the student achievement 
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criteria and went over the process for determining the student achievement 
performance incentives.   
 The third guiding question addressed how the principals and teachers responded 
to the design of the CP.  Overwhelmingly, the responses of the principals were positive 
regarding the three areas of the performance incentive criteria for teachers.  None of the 
eight questions asked during the interview had a majority of negative responses.   
 The final guiding question dealt with implications for school leaders wishing to 
design and implement a similar program in the future.  This study has highlighted 
several implications for school leaders and policymakers. 
Implications of the Findings 
 First, given what is now known from the CP principals regarding the principal’s 
evaluation component of the teacher performance incentive criteria, this researcher 
suggests that future iterations either change the principal’s evaluation component or not 
include principal’s evaluations in the teacher performance incentive criteria at all.  While 
53% of principals felt the component helped his/her school, 47% believed the 
component had no effect on the school.  There was also much discussion among the 
CP stakeholders regarding inflated teacher ratings despite most schools facing serious 
student achievement challenges.  Based on the principals’ responses, the belief of this 
researcher is that the ratings were inflated before the CP ever started and that the 
phenomenon was only highlighted as a result of the principal’s evaluation component of 
the criteria for teachers.  Also, the principals gave varied reasons for why the ratings 
were inflated, including:  
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• The teacher evaluation form issued by DPI did not address student 
achievement. 
• The need to keep faculty morale high. 
• A desire to reward teachers for hard work rather than the test results of 
his/her students. 
• Pressure from teachers related to the funding attached to the evaluation. 
• A desire to provide extra money to his/her teachers. 
• A quid pro quo where principals assigned inflated teacher evaluation ratings 
in exchange for favorable ratings on the Teacher Working Conditions Survey. 
 There are several possibilities for altering this component into a more viable 
option or future performance incentive programs.  For example, the stakeholders of a 
potential performance incentive program could meet, examine the current teacher 
evaluation data, and set baselines for the evaluations.  Also, the leadership of the 
performance incentive program should establish expectations regarding the evaluations 
in the initial stages of the performance incentive system and communicate those 
expectations clearly to the evaluators.  Perhaps the CP leadership did not spend 
enough time in early 2007 stressing that the principal’s evaluation was designed to give 
principals more leverage to motivate teachers to perform better.  At least one principal 
directly addressed this issue when he/she said, “It wasn’t emphasized enough to us in 
the beginning.  I didn’t realize the impact…I just don’t think it was emphasized enough.”  
Therefore, again, the recommendation of this researcher is to either modify the 
principal’s evaluation component or exclude the principal’s evaluation component from 
any future attempts at performance pay initiatives for teachers. 
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 Including the student achievement and professional development components of 
the teacher performance incentive criteria are another implication of this study for 
school leaders and policymakers.  There is support in the literature and in the findings of 
this study for the inclusion of these two areas in future performance incentive programs.  
Odden & Kelley, in their 2002 book, wrote that many performance incentive programs 
reward teachers for student achievement and/or the successful completion of 
professional development modules.  There is also agreement in the body of reviewed 
literature on specific components of performance incentive programs (Center for 
Teaching Quality, 2007; Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Perkins-Gough, 2007).  
Included among these are the provision of additional pay for individuals who participate 
in additional and relevant professional development (Center for Teaching Quality, 2007; 
Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Perkins-Gough, 2007).  The principals interviewed 
for this study supported the aforementioned research.  Of the principals interviewed, 
76% believed the student achievement component helped the school and 88% believed 
the professional development component helped the school.   
 Yet another implication for school leaders wishing to develop a performance 
incentive program grew out of the challenge regarding the few teachers of tested 
subjects who received less student achievement performance incentive than some 
teachers of non-tested subjects.  Despite receiving some complaints, the principals 
interviewed overwhelmingly responded that excluding the teachers of non-tested 
subjects would harm their schools.  Only one principal (6%) responded in any other way 
to the question.  Nearly all of the principals mentioned the increased collaboration and 
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contributions from all teachers as a result of the student achievement performance 
incentives.   
 There appeared to be a large amount of confusion amongst the principals 
regarding their level of involvement in the process for determining the performance 
incentive criteria after the first two Leadership Institutes.  Beginning with the third 
Leadership Institute, an Advisory Committee was formed.  The committee was made up 
of the CP leadership, the superintendent of each of the five districts, and the central 
office contact from each of the five districts.  Making minor adjustments to the 
performance incentive criteria and dealing with challenges as they arose were the 
primary tasks of the committee.  Based on conversations with the CO leadership, they 
were aware that the creation of the Advisory Committee would exclude principals from 
the final decision-making process.  However, the interview results would suggest 
confusion regarding the role of the Advisory Committee.   
 There are perhaps two questions at stake.  How much of the confusion 
surrounding the Advisory Committee is legitimate?  How clearly was the transition to the 
Advisory Committee communicated to the principals?  Research indicates that including 
stakeholders in the development and implementation of performance pay programs 
increases the likelihood of a successful program (Center for Teaching Quality, 2007; 
Harris, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Perkins-Gough, 2007).  The implication for school 
leaders and policymakers is to make a decision from the outset as to the inclusion of all 
stakeholders in the decision-making process versus a committee and to communicate 
that decision clearly to all stakeholders.   
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 The final implication for school leaders wishing to design a performance incentive 
initiative revolves around teacher retirement.  Despite the teacher recruitment/retention 
focus of performance incentive programs, understand that some teachers will use the 
incentives for purposes other than for which they were designed.  Nearly a quarter of 
the principals interviewed acknowledged that there were teachers in their schools who 
used the performance incentives associated with the CP over the three years of the pilot 
to drive up their final average salary for retirement.  After the three years, they then 
retired with a higher monthly check than they would have without the incentives 
associated with the CP. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 The first recommendation for further research revolves around the discovery of a 
quid pro quo within the Collaborative Project (CP), perhaps the most surprising and 
significant finding of this study.  The most immediate question arising from this study is 
whether or not a performance incentive program on any level can be developed that 
insulates against a quid pro quo.  That question raises more questions regarding quid 
pro quos for further study on a much broader level than just education.  How common 
are quid pro quos, not only in education, but in the fields of business, politics, or 
medicine?  What is the ethical boundary for quid pro quos, if there is one?  Are there 
varying degrees of legality or illegality surrounding quid pro quos?  Are quid pro quos 
simply part of the human condition?  This researcher believes there are opportunities for 
further study on quid pro quos in education, anthropology, and psychology. 
 A second recommendation for further study is stakeholder involvement in the 
decision-making processes of performance incentive initiatives.  As reported in the 
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findings, there was some disagreement amongst the principals regarding their level of 
participation in the decision-making process of the CP.  Therefore, what degree of 
stakeholder involvement in the decision-making processes of the development and 
implementation is optimal for a successful program?   
 The third recommendation for further study involves the principal’s evaluation 
component of the performance incentive criteria for teachers.  Is there a way to include 
subjective evaluations in a performance incentive program that insulates against 
opportunities for a quid pro quo?  Is there a means for including the evaluations in a 
meaningful way that could help advance the goals of the school and/or the incentive 
program? 
 Another recommendation for further research treats the manner in which 
teachers regard the incentives themselves.  Is there a way to create a performance 
incentive system for teachers that prevents opportunities for teachers to use the 
incentives in ways other than the developers of the program intended?  Was it harmful 
to the CP for teachers to admit that they used the incentives to drive up his/her final 
average salary for retirement rather than to improve student achievement and teacher 
retention rates?  This phenomenon affected both good teachers and bad, according to 
the principals.   
 One final question that this study has raised is why have incentives to motivate 
people to do the job for which they are contracted in the first place?  Herzberg’s 
research that was quoted in Chapter Two suggested that incentives in the private sector 
did not work as expected (Herzberg et al., 1959).  Does this research stand up to 
 93 
 
performance incentive programs in education?  Should the federal government continue 
to encourage school leaders to move toward performance incentives in schools? 
Summary 
 The findings generated from this study have highlighted several implications for 
school leaders and policymakers.  Based on the principals’ responses regarding the 
principal’s evaluation component of the teacher performance incentive criteria, this 
researcher suggests that future iterations either modify the principal’s evaluation 
component or not include principal’s evaluations in the teacher performance incentive 
criteria at all.   
 A second implication for school leaders and policymakers is the inclusion of the 
student achievement and professional development components of the performance 
incentive system.  Both the responses of the principals and the literature support the 
inclusion of these two components.  
 The third implication for school leaders involves the inclusion of teachers of non-
tested subjects/grades in the student achievement component of the performance 
incentive system. Despite receiving some complaints, the principals interviewed 
overwhelmingly responded that excluding the teachers of non-tested subjects would 
harm their schools. 
 Yet another implication for school leaders and policymakers is to make a 
decision from the outset as to the inclusion of all stakeholders in the decision-making 
process versus an advisory committee and to communicate that decision clearly to all 
stakeholders.   
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 The final implication for school leaders wishing to design a performance incentive 
initiative revolves around teacher retirement.  Understand that some teachers will use 
the incentives for purposes other than for which they were designed.  Nearly a quarter 
of the principals interviewed acknowledged that there were teachers in their schools 
who used the performance incentives associated with the CP over the three years of the 
pilot to drive up their final average salary for retirement. 
 Based on the findings and their implications for school leaders, this researcher 
has recommendations for future research.  The first recommendation revolves around 
the discovery of a quid pro quo in the principal’s evaluation component of the 
performance incentive system and the questions this raises. This researcher believes 
there are opportunities for further study on quid pro quos in education, anthropology, 
and psychology. 
 A second recommendation for further study is stakeholder involvement in the 
decision-making processes of performance incentive initiatives. What degree of 
stakeholder involvement in the decision-making processes of the development and 
implementation is optimal for a successful program?   
 The third recommendation for further study involves the principal’s evaluation 
component of the performance incentive criteria for teachers.  Is there a way to include 
subjective evaluations in a performance incentive program that insulates against 
opportunities for a quid pro quo?  Is there a means for including the evaluations in a 
meaningful way that could help advance the goals of the school and/or the incentive 
program? 
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 Another recommendation for further research treats the manner in which 
teachers regard the incentives themselves.  Is there a way to create a performance 
incentive system for teachers that prevents opportunities for teachers to use the 
incentives in ways other than the developers of the program intended? 
 The final recommendation for further study involves research on performance 
incentives in the private sector.  Herzberg’s research suggests that performance 
incentives do not work as intended in the private sector (Herzberg et al., 1959).  Does 
this research hold up in the field of education? 
This chapter was organized into four sections, beginning with the conclusions 
related to the guiding questions.  The implications of the findings are provided in the 
second section of this chapter.  The third section offered recommendations for further 
research, and the final section summarized the chapter.
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APPENDIX A:  PRINCIPALS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE DESIGN 
 
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COLLABORATIVE  
 
PROJECT SURVEY 
 
1. Did the student achievement component of the CP improve, hurt, or have no 
effect on your school?  If it helped, in what way or ways?  If it created problems 
or “hurt” your school, in what way or ways?  If it had no real effect, why, in your 
opinion, was this? 
 
2. Did the principal’s evaluation component of the performance incentives improve, 
hurt, or have no effect on your school?  If it helped, in what way or ways?  If it 
created problems or “hurt” your school, in what way or ways?  If it had not real 
effect, why, in your opinion, was this? 
 
3. The principal’s evaluation performance incentive was designed to give principals 
more leverage to motivate teachers to perform, but almost all principals 
continued to assign teachers overly inflated ratings.  This occurred even in 
schools with serious student achievement challenges.  In your opinion, why did 
this happen? 
 
4. Did the professional development component of the CP improve, hurt, or have no 
effect on your school?  If it helped, in what way or ways?  If it created problems 
or “hurt” your school, in what way or ways?  If it had no real effect, why, in your 
opinion, was this? 
 
5. Evaluation reports on the Collaborative Project (CP) from the Carolina Institute 
for Public Policy indicate that a number of teachers complained that others who 
taught tested subjects received less performance incentive for student 
achievement than teachers of non-tested subjects (who were rewarded based on 
school-wide results).  Did any teachers in your school complain about this?  If so, 
how widespread were the complaints?  How did you, as the leader of the school, 
address this issue? 
 
6. If the decision had been made to exclude the teachers of non-tested subjects 
from the student achievement performance incentive, would this have helped 
your school or would it have caused problems?  How? 
 
7. Evaluators from the Carolina Institute for Public Policy noted that the 
superintendents, central office contacts, and principals from all five participating 
districts confirmed that they had been “fully involved” in the process for 
determining the performance incentive criteria.  Do you think this is correct?  The 
evaluators added that in order for the performance incentives to be effective, the 
incentives developed by the stakeholders had to balance high standards with the 
realization that the incentives had to be realistically achievable.  In your opinion, 
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were the stakeholders in the CP successful in creating performance incentive 
criteria that blended high standards with achievability?  If so, why do you think 
so?  If not, why not? 
 
 
8. The CP was originally described as a three-year pilot project with part of its 
emphasis being the recruitment/retention of teachers and administrators.  All 
stakeholders initially thought the CP would end at the conclusion of the three 
years – at the end of the 2009-10 school year.  During the 2008-09 legislative 
session, the CP was given a fourth year by the General Assembly.  However, at 
least in one district, a large number of teachers retired at the end of the third 
year. They viewed the performance incentives as a way to significantly boost 
their salary so that their retirement payments would be higher using the 3 years 
of the CP.  In other words, despite the teacher retention focus of the project, a 
certain population of teachers planned to retire at the conclusion of the original 
three years from the outset of the CP.  Did you observe similar instances of 
teachers attempting to drive up their final average salary for retirement in your 
school?  If so, were these teachers your better teachers?  How will your retention 
rates be impacted by this phenomenon? 
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APPENDIX C:  CONSENT SCRIPT 
 
You are being invited to participate in a research study, “The Collaborative Project:  Principals’ 
Perceptions Related to the Development and Implementation of a Teacher Performance Incentive 
Initiative,” being conducted by Patrick C. Miller, a student at East Carolina University in the 
Department of Educational Leadership. The goal is to conduct telephone interviews with 15 
principals from the five participating districts of the Collaborative Project. The survey will take 
approximately 45 minutes to complete. It is hoped that this information will assist us to better 
understand potential issues surrounding the development and implementation of performance 
incentive programs for teachers.  Your participation in the research is voluntary. You may 
choose not to answer any or all questions, and you may stop at any time.  
There is no penalty for not taking part in this research study. 
Please call the principal investigator, Patrick C. Miller, at (252) 747-3425 for any research 
related questions or the UMCIRB at 252-744-2914 for questions about your rights as a research 
participant. 
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